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Abstract 
This thesis explores the theory that International Humanitarian Non-
governmental Organisations (IHNGOs) have increasingly become part of 
the world-ordering security agenda of developed western states since the 
end of the Cold War. It argues that the adoption of humanitarian aid and 
development activities by intervening military forces in Afghanistan, 
criticised by IHNGOs for blurring the boundaries between humanitarian 
and military actors, is a symptom of, rather than the central reason for, 
reduced humanitarian space in Afghanistan. This study contends that the 
central issue is the wider integration of political, military and humanitarian 
action into the process of state-building as a way to pacify areas of conflict 
and instability that otherwise present potential security threats to the 
developed world. This has become even more pronounced with the aims 
of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) since 2001. 
 
The merging of humanitarian aid and development with security in the 
pursuit of stable states has occurred as an international response to the 
humanitarian crises and intra-state wars since the end of the Cold War. 
Military involvement of this kind is typified in Afghanistan by Provincial 
Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) that combine security and development 
action. During the 1990s humanitarianism also underwent a 
metamorphosis as concern about the role aid could have in fuelling conflict 
and a desire to ameliorate the underlying causes of poverty and conflict 
led many aid agencies to adopt a new vision of humanitarianism that had 
political and social goals beyond those of just meeting the immediate 
needs of populations in crisis. Another feature of humanitarian 
interventions of the 1990s was the ambitious expectations placed upon 
IHNGOs and intervening military forces from the international community 
to manage or resolve these crises without a corresponding level of long-
term political, economic and military commitment. These issues are also 
present in post-2001 Afghanistan where IHNGOs initially supported an 
international intervention and a new government which has since been 
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faced with a growing insurgency. Consequently, involvement with state-
building, governance, rights and development have placed IHNGOs at 
odds with the insurgents. 
 
A case study approach is used to examine five major IHNGOs and how 
they fit into the context of the international state-building project in post-
2001 Afghanistan. The central finding of this study is that the integration of 
humanitarian aid and development into state-building as a means to 
enhance international security has seriously compromised the claims to 
the principles of neutrality, impartiality and independence central to the 
concept of humanitarian space and consequently the security of the 
IHNGOs in the ongoing Afghanistan conflict. 
 
To overcome these problems this study suggests that IHNGOs should 
place their humanitarian aid activity under a separate umbrella 
organisation that operates under the neutral, impartial and independent 
principles adhered to by the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC), the organisation in this study that has managed to maintain some 
acceptance and dialogue with all parties to conflict. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
This study examines International Humanitarian Non-Governmental 
Organisations (IHNGOs) and how they have been involved with and 
affected by the integration of aid, development, political and military action 
in the international intervention and state-building processes that have 
evolved in the post-Cold War era. This study specifically examines this in 
the case of Afghanistan and the international intervention that has taken 
place there since 2001. 
 
Chapter two provides a background to three major theoretical approaches 
to the study of non-governmental organisations and their relations with 
states. The realist state-centric model, the Global Civil Society (GCS) 
model and the Marxist post-colonial models are outlined. Aspects of these 
three theories are later used to help explain developments in both aid and 
state security since the end of the Cold War. The third theory is significant 
to the study as it helps to explain the merging of aid and development with 
security. The principle concern of this paper is to examine the validity of 
the concept put forward by some academics from the Marxist post-colonial 
school of thought that IHNGOs have become part of the security and world 
ordering agenda of western developed states since the end of the Cold 
War and through the first decade of the post-Cold War and global war on 
terror (GWOT). 
 
The methodology employed in this paper is outlined in chapter three. The 
criteria for the selection of the five IHNGOs examined in this study are 
explained, as is the choice of the international intervention in Afghanistan 
for a case study. The thesis of this study is outlined in this chapter. In brief, 
it contends that IHNGO engagement with the GWOT objective of major 
western states in securing zones of instability on the global periphery for 
their own state security has reduced the supposed neutral, physical and 
political humanitarian space IHNGOs operate within. This is especially 
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problematic for the IHNGOs in an ongoing conflict like that in Afghanistan 
where this involvement has a serious impact on security. 
 
Chapter four traces the history of four significant humanitarian crises and 
interventions of the 1990s that were due to the intra-state conflicts in 
Somalia, Bosnia, Rwanda and Kosovo. This period is significant for the 
rapid changes that occurred in IHNGO approaches to dealing with 
complex emergencies in conflict and post-conflict settings and how military 
forces started to be involved in activities beyond war fighting, specifically 
in providing aid and development assistance. The policy positions of the 
IHNGOs towards the interventions and their approaches to whether to 
cooperate with intervening governments and their military forces are also 
outlined to demonstrate the coming together of the state and non-state 
actors, their activities and their respective agendas that would have 
serious consequences in the case of Afghanistan after 2001. 
 
The context of Afghanistan is outlined in chapter five so as to provide a 
geographical, cultural, historical and political background to the 
environment in which IHNGOs and international military forces would 
operate from late 2001. The involvement of IHNGOs in Afghanistan is 
traced from the time of the Soviet invasion and through the periods of the 
civil war and Taliban rule. The experiences of the IHNGOs in this time 
would influence their later involvement and the situation they encountered 
after 2001 would prove to be very different to what had gone before. The 
United Nations Strategic Framework for Afghanistan is examined in this 
chapter, since it was the first attempt at the integration of political, 
humanitarian assistance and human rights under a unified UN structure.  
 
The five IHNGOs selected for this study are examined in chapter six. 
These five IHNGOs share common attributes such as being large, long 
standing, western based and secular. A brief historical outline of the 
organisations is provided along with an overview of their principal 
activities, organisational structure, policy positions and sources of funding. 
The division between IHNGOs that focus on short-term humanitarian relief 
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and those that provide both short-term relief and longer-term development 
are also highlighted as this is considered a factor in how they interact with 
and are affected by the state-building process in ongoing or post-conflict 
situations. 
 
The development of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) is outlined in 
chapter seven. The role of aid and development in counter-insurgency 
strategy and previous examples of it are identified. Assessments of the 
effectiveness of the PRTs are given from military and political points of 
view as well as the extensive criticisms of them from the IHNGO sector. 
The PRTs, their activities and their deployments are also placed within the 
wider political and military context of post 2001 Afghanistan. The idea is 
put forward in this chapter that PRTs were an attempt to establish security 
and extend government control without deploying large numbers of troops. 
Consequently they were hampered by these limitations as well as by 
restrictive national caveats surrounding their actions and movements. 
However, the frequent criticism from IHNGOs that the blurring of the lines 
between humanitarian and military actors attributed to the PRTs is the 
principle reason for IHNGO insecurity being questioned, as this study 
suggests there are other contributory factors and deeper underlying 
causes. 
 
In chapter eight, the five IHNGOs in this study are assessed in terms of 
their activities, involvement with state-building, security issues and policy 
positions on military deployment and the use of aid and development by 
the military in post 2001Afghanistan. How the IHNGOs are perceived by 
the Afghan population and belligerents, their access, acceptance and 
security concerns are also examined. Attacks against IHNGO staff in 
Afghanistan have been increasing and spreading across the country, 
especially in the last three to four years, and this chapter assesses the 
factors contributing to this. The blurring of the lines argument is frequently 
put forward by the IHNGOs but this study proposes that the wider issue of 
the merging of aid and development with security has contributed to the 
problem by the involvement of some IHNGOs in the internationally backed 
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state-building process. Although the IHNGOs and the international 
community had believed they were operating in a post-conflict situation 
after 2001, it is suggested that the early support for intervention and 
creation of a new government has now placed the IHNGOs at odds with 
the armed opposition groups (AOGs) and their campaign to attack and 
destabilise the state-building process.  
 
Chapter nine places the issues faced by IHNGOs in Afghanistan since 
2001 into the wider post-Cold War relationship that has evolved between 
the new humanitarianism and a security agenda implicit in the process of 
state-building by western developed states in areas of conflict. This 
coming together of political, military and humanitarian action is known as 
integration or coherence. The difficulties for IHNGOs in claiming a neutral 
humanitarian space in an integrated state-building intervention include 
moral and political overlap with intervening states, a legacy of IHNGO 
post-Cold War involvement with interventions and state-building, the use 
by states of humanitarian action for military and political ends and the 
desire from political and military actors that IHNGOs cooperate in support 
of counter-insurgency operations. This chapter also explores some options 
for IHNGOs in dealing with the security problems presented by 
deployment in integrated state-building interventions.
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Chapter Two: Theoretical Framework 
Introduction 
To put the current situation involving international humanitarian non-
governmental organisations (IHNGOs) and the military of intervening 
powers in the case of Afghanistan into context, some exploration is 
required of the major theories that have influenced the analysis of non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) and their relationships with 
governments, the military and other state and non-state actors. Since the 
end of the Second World War the growth of NGOs and their increasing 
influence on and involvement with humanitarian aid, development, 
international human rights and humanitarian law has led to theoretical 
models to explain the strengthening of their roles and influence in 
international relations. An example of a theory about the role of NGOs and 
other non-state actors in the international system is the theory of global 
civil society (GCS).1  
 
Realist, GCS and post-colonial neo-Marxist perspectives on NGO 
involvement with military interventions will be outlined in developing the 
framework for this study to examine the specific situation regarding 
IHNGO-military relations in Afghanistan. The first two perspectives typify 
the divide between classical realism and liberal idealism in the study of 
international relations. This study argues that the relationship between 
states (and their military forces) and NGOs represents the interface 
between actors representing the traditional state-centric view of realism 
with the liberal/idealist stance of GCS. The third neo-Marxist post-colonial 
perspective derived from Marxist analysis of political economy focuses on 
the global economic and political inequality of international relations 
combined with the disillusionment of some within the NGO community with 
the manipulation of humanitarian aid for political purposes.  
                                            
1
 See, for example: David Chandler, Constructing Global Civil Society: Morality and 
Power in International Relations (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004); Marlies 
Glasius, Mary Kaldor and Helmut Anheier, Global Civil Society Yearbook 2005/2006 
(London Sage, 2005). 
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Realism, states and non-governmental organisations 
Realists see the state as the central actor in international relations and 
view state sovereignty as an inviolable central principle of relations 
between states.2 The centrality of state sovereignty and territorial integrity 
are recognised as fundamental principles in the Charter of the United 
Nations (UN).3 For realists, the state is seen as the ultimate force in 
deciding the fate of its own citizens. Further, it is accepted that one state 
should not intervene in another state‟s affairs, regardless of how that state 
may treat its own citizens. Realist thinking also views the actions of states 
as being motivated by the states‟ own interests in the decisions and 
actions that they take.4   
 
A frequent criticism of NGOs from a state-centric perspective is that 
despite claims of impartiality and neutrality they are actually the 
manipulated agents of states. Funding from donor governments is often 
cited as a major factor of influence on NGOs, since “most donor 
governments allocate aid funds according to their political priorities.”5 
Another pressure on NGOs that can be identified as being caused by the 
influence of donor governments is the competition among NGOs for donor 
government funding which leads to NGO policies and programmes that 
are congruent with the wishes of the donor government.6 
                                            
2
 See, for examples of the Westphalian state model: Richard Langhorne, Introduction to 
Global Politics (London: Hodder Arnold, 2006) pp.71-73; Michael Mastanduno, 
„Hegemonic States as Pacifying Powers: Why it May be Difficult to Count on the United 
States,‟ in Strategies for Peace: Contributions of International Organizations,States and 
Non-State Actors, ed. by Volker Rittberger and Martina Fischer (Opladen & Farming Hills: 
Barbara Budrich, 2008), pp.179-221. 
3
 The United Nations, Charter of the United Nations: Article 2 (1), (4) and (7) 
<http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml> [Accessed 17 March, 2009]. 
4
 Jennifer Welsh, „Taking Consequences Seriously: Objections to Humanitarian 
Intervention,‟ in Humanitarian Intervention and State Sovereignty, ed. by Jennifer Welsh 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p.58. 
5
  Fiona Terry, Condemned to Repeat?: The Paradox of Humanitarian Action (London: 
Cornell University Press, 2002), p.23. See, for further examples of this type of criticism of 
government funding of NGOs: Kurt Mills, „Neo-Humanitarianism: The Role of International 
Humanitarian Norms and Organisations in Contemporary Conflict,‟ Global Governance, 
11 (2005), 161-183, Loramy Gerstbauer, „The New Conflict Managers: Peace-building 
NGOs and State Agendas,‟ in New Threats and New Actors in International Security, ed. 
by Elke Krahmann (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p.35. 
6
 Christopher Spearin, „Humanitarians and Mercenaries: Partners in Security 
Governance?‟ in New Threats and New Actors in International Security, ed. by 
Krahmann, p.48. 
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David Chandler, a critic of NGO complicity with the actions of states, and 
especially with military intervention, sees the humanitarian principles and 
actions of NGOs as being exploited by governments for much more realist 
state-centred concerns. For example, the US led war in Afghanistan 
against the Taliban and Al Qaeda since 2001, although having other state 
based goals such as self defence following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, was 
also presented as a war on behalf of humanitarian concerns to remove the 
Taliban, a harsh regime that had committed human rights abuses against 
its own population. The US at the outset of the war dropped food aid as 
well as bombs to demonstrate their supposed humanitarian motives.7 Kurt 
Mills suggests this has led to „neo-humanitarianism‟ which is 
“...distinguished by the explicit manipulation of humanitarianism for 
political or military gain on the ground in a conflict or as a substitute for 
political or military action.”8 Issues of state interest, especially in terms of 
projecting force beyond its own borders for security purposes or to secure 
access to resources are, from a realist point of view, the real issues 
beneath the humanitarian surface. David Reiff further argues that the 
ideological focus of NGOs on human rights as opposed to just 
humanitarian assistance plus their cooption into the political agendas of 
states have undermined their credibility as truly humanitarian actors.9 
 
Therefore, when looked at through the realist lens, NGOs, despite the 
label of being „non-governmental‟, are still influenced to a considerable 
extent by the governments of both donor and recipient states. This 
influence is exerted by the recipient or intervened-in states in allowing or 
denying NGOs access to populations in need, by donor states‟ funding of 
NGOs and in the politically selective claims of upholding humanitarian 
principles that are made by intervening states. 
 
                                            
7
 David Chandler, From Kosovo to Kabul: Human Rights and International Intervention. 
(London: Pluto, 2002), pp.1-2. 
8
 Kurt Mills, „Neo-Humanitarianism: The Role of International Humanitarian Norms and 
Organisations in Contemporary Conflict,‟ (p.162).   
9
 David Rieff, A Bed for the Night: Humanitarianism in Crisis (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 2002). 
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The state-building project in new or formerly failed states holds state 
formation and the extension of the control and legitimacy of the 
internationally recognised government in that state as central concerns. 
Involvement in this process is presented by the intervening states as the 
actions of good global citizens. The New Zealand involvement in 
Afghanistan providing a PRT as part of the International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF) is an example of this. According to the New 
Zealand government, its PRT is helping extend the control of the Afghan 
government into the provinces and improving security and stability by 
training the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police 
(ANP).10  
 
Human Security and Global Civil Society (GCS) 
The concepts of human security and global civil society (GCS) have 
developed in the last two decades as alternatives to the realist state-
centric approach. GSC has its roots in the theory of functionalism that 
developed in the 1940s.11 Functionalism suggested that economic and 
social cooperation would cut across state boundaries, therefore reducing 
the importance of state sovereignty. International organisations such as 
the UN were also emphasised by this theory.12 David Chandler further 
suggests that the GCS model developed as a reaction to the realist view, 
especially as it emphasises human agency rather than economics.13 Mary 
Kaldor argues that the concept of security that was previously centred on 
state security has altered in the last two decades due to globalisation and 
the growth in numbers and influence of non-state actors such as IHNGOs. 
Human security is concerned with the “...growing concern about the fate of 
                                            
10
 New Zealand Defence Force, NZ PRT: New Zealand Provincial Reconstruction Team 
Twelve, updated 26 November, 2008, 
<http://www.nzdf.mil.nz/operations/deployments/afghanistan/nz-prt/default.htm> 
[Accessed 12 November, 2009], (para.7). 
11
 Paul Taylor, „Functionalism: The Theory of David Mitrany,‟ in International 
Organisation, ed. by Paul Taylor and A.J.R Groom (London: Frances Pinter, 1978), pp. 
236-252. 
12
 Joseph S. Nye, Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and 
History (New York: Pearson, 2007), p.262. 
13
 Chandler, Constructing Global Civil Society: Morality and Power in International 
Relations, pp. 6-12. 
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individual beings and their communities, rather than states.”14 From the 
GCS perspective, IHNGOs as trans-border actors with their support for 
human rights and humanitarian principles, norms considered universal by 
international law and the UN, have at least partly transcended state 
sovereignty. It must be noted that NGOs are not, however, viewed as the 
only element of GCS, and the concept itself is wide ranging and contested 
even among its proponents.15 Individuals, profit and not for profit 
organisations, social movements, cultural and religious groups and trade 
unions among others are also considered to constitute GCS.16  
 
Information and communication technology has significantly contributed to 
the spread of GCS.17 According to John Keane “global civil society is a 
vast, interconnected and multilayered social space that comprises many 
hundreds of thousands of self-directing or non-governmental institutions 
and ways of life.”18 Communication technology, especially the internet, has 
allowed these diverse groupings to communicate their ideas and causes to 
a global public as well as communicate and work with each other 
regardless of geographical separation. Sumit Roy identifies compression 
of the world economy, the blurring of national borders and the creation of a 
new space that now coexists alongside states as the important features of 
globalisation that have also contributed to the growth of GCS.19   
 
The extent of the influence of the concepts of GCS and human security at 
the start of the 21st century is apparent in the report of the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). Established 
by the Government of Canada, the ICISS followed on from 
                                            
14
 Mary Kaldor, Human Security: Reflections on Globalisation, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
2007), p.12. 
15
 See, for example, The Centre for the Study of Global Governance, London School of 
Economics. Global Civil Society Yearbooks, available  online from 
<http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/global/yearbook07-8.htm>  
16
 John Keane, „Global Civil Society?‟ in Global Civil Society Yearbook 2001, ed. by 
Helmut Anheier, Marlies Glasius and Mary Kaldor. 
<http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/global/Publications/Yearbooks/2001/2001chapter1.pdf>[Acc
essed 15 March 2009], p.23. 
17
 Sumit Roy, Globalisation, ICT and Developing Nations (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 
2005), p.13. 
18
 Keane, p.23. 
19
 Roy, p.13. 
10 
 
recommendations in 2000 from the then UN Secretary General Kofi 
Annan. The report outlined the supposed responsibility of states to protect 
their own citizens from serious violations such as genocide, or potentially 
face the threat of military intervention from other states. State sovereignty 
in the context of the ICISS is, therefore, conditional upon how a state 
treats its own citizens, which is a departure from the realist perspective 
where sovereignty is paramount and a state can do as it wishes within its 
own borders. The ICISS acknowledged the role of NGOs, the media and 
academics (civil society actors) in promoting awareness of the issues that 
had led to the report and its recommendations.20 According to Keane 
“global civil society has emerged and today flourishes in the absence of a 
global state or empire.”21  
 
The concept of GCS has limitations in that those with the access to 
technology to allow them to be „interconnected‟ are not those in dire need 
of assistance. The early optimism of the post cold war era has suffered 
due to continuing tragedies like Somalia and present-day crises such as in 
Darfur. The ineffective nature of the UN in the face of these crises leaves 
the recommendations of the ICSS and the supposed responsibility of 
states to protect their own citizens lacking in terms of any real enforcement 
or implementation. The „global war on terror‟ (GWOT) since 2001 has also 
challenged the goals of GCS and human security as these concepts have 
been partly side lined by the US priority of forming alliances with states in 
the war on terror regardless of their internal human rights records and the 
closer alignment of donor aid expenditure with security agendas.22 
Marxist and post-colonial criticism 
A third group of theorists, however, believe the problems of 
underdevelopment, poverty and conflict are due to economic and political 
inequality and the championing of liberal capitalism under the hegemony 
of a global empire. They tend to perceive an imperial role either for a state 
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or group of states, principally the US, or the US and other western, 
developed nations. This approach also sees globalisation and GCS as 
forms of economic, political or even humanitarian imperialism. In relation 
to NGOs, these ideas have grown out of Marxist and post-colonial 
criticisms of Western development and aid to the poorest parts of the 
world. Mark Duffield argues that “... the NGO movement has established 
itself as a non-state or petty sovereign power among the world of 
peoples.”23 Development and emergency relief aid, according to this 
perspective, are seen as methods for containing and managing the 
surplus population in the decolonised world.24  
 
The disillusionment of some who have worked in the area of humanitarian 
aid and who have witnessed aid contributing to conflicts or being co-opted 
for political purposes has also fed into this school of thought.25 The 
merging of security with development is a central point for Duffield and 
within this he sees the growth of NGOs as representing an “international 
liberal trusteeship” that has been extended via emergency and conflict 
“ignoring existing laws, conventions or restraints” therefore becoming a 
form of colonisation.26 Duffield uses the analogy of native administration 
that was employed as a bulwark against nationalist movements in the 
times of British colonial rule with the current sustainable development 
model that he claims has merged with security as a means of managing 
internal conflict.27  In this context, NGOs operating across borders to 
provide aid in emergency and conflict situations may be creating a 
precedent, as Vanessa Pupavac suggests, that is degrading the 
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sovereignty of some states.28 Stuart Elden has explored the situation of 
contingent sovereignty where a particular state may no longer claim 
sovereignty over parts of its own territory due to humanitarian crises or 
wars that the state is either encouraging or unable to prevent.29 “In theory 
the borders themselves may change, but in practice it is more likely that 
some states may cease to be sovereign within them.”30  It should be noted 
that deeper underlying issues such as ethnic or religious differences are 
the root causes that provide the impetus for the fragmentation of a state 
that then may lose sovereignty over those parts. The situation in Kosovo 
since 1999 where part of the state of Serbia was occupied by NATO in a 
humanitarian military intervention is such an example. Military 
interventions of this type have led to claims of a new imperialism from 
some academics and developing states.  
 
David Harvey argues that the US has become an imperial power through 
its role of enforcing a vision of democracy and neo-liberal economics upon 
states that do not fit the neo-liberal democratic model.31 Michael Ignatieff 
also sees the US as an imperial power, but this is a humanitarian empire 
with the US leading other Western, developed states such as the UK, 
France and Germany, that is “...the new face of an old figure: the 
democratic free world, the Christian West.”32  Not all writers who discuss 
the role of US imperialism necessarily see the term as pejorative. Niall 
Ferguson suggests the US has had the imperial role thrust upon it and that 
it needs to accept it and rise to the task.33 None the less, the concept of an 
empire with emphasis on a hegemonic state such as the US, or 
hegemonic non-state structures such as NGO petty sovereignty provides a 
point of view at odds with the progressive idealism of GCS. A shortcoming 
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with the Marxist post-colonial criticisms of humanitarian aid and its 
complicity with the agendas of western neo-liberal economics and the US 
is the lack of any viable alternative on offer that can seriously ameliorate 
the conditions for those in poverty and especially in zones of conflict. 
Interestingly, Vanessa Pupavac in her criticism of human security recalls 
state-centred economic development and a strengthening of sovereignty 
as a way forward.34 This reads, in some ways, as an argument for a return 
to the realist approach with its emphasis on the state, strong central 
government, national development and state sovereignty. 
 
Elements of the three theories relevant to this study 
Elements of the three broad theoretical positions - the state-centric realist 
model, the trans-border GCS model and the Marxist post-colonial criticism 
of humanitarian imperialism - will be drawn out in developing the 
theoretical framework that will guide this study. Even GCS theorists would 
agree that states are still fundamental in the world system, if not as much 
as they once may have been. It is still the governments of states that 
make the decision to deploy military personnel, which aid agencies they 
fund and how much funding and support they provide. Equally, the 
international community prioritises the rebuilding of failed states, since 
those states can then control the legitimate use of force within their own 
borders. The United Nations system is made up of states that recognise 
that the UN is able to provide aid through major international NGOs and it 
is able to deploy peacekeeping forces, although the Security Council has 
almost always been hindered by the agendas and power of veto of the 
permanent members.35 For NGOs, the state-centric view is significant both 
in the role of donor governments that provide at least part of their funding 
and through the issue of access into states to reach populations that need 
their assistance. States that constitute international and intergovernmental 
organisations such as the UN or European Union (EU) that may work with 
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and fund NGOs are, from the state point of view, operating with “some 
type of self-interest as the underlying reason for acceding to cooperative 
arrangements.”36  
 
GCS has, through rapid communications, and especially the internet, 
influenced populations across borders and how people in the developed 
west perceive events in the developing world. As a result of the public 
statements and advocacy work of NGOs, western governments cannot 
ignore the images and discourse presented about their actions overseas. 
The importance of GCS is underlined by the fact that NGOs administer a 
large portion of aid provided by donor states. Ian Smillie and Larry Minear 
state that “NGOs manage about 60 percent of all humanitarian funding.”37 
They point out that some major IHNGOs “have larger budgets than the 
government ministries to which they relate” and “carry more credibility with 
taxpayers than do government aid agencies.”38  The ability of NGOs to 
administer aid budgets and work with UN agencies as implementing 
partners is important in supporting the proposition that that they wield a 
functionally based non-state power. Perhaps the most important force they 
possess, and one that is of great value to donor governments, is their 
perceived public credibility. 
 
Combining the realist approach of state interests with GCS provides a 
model where states and GCS are in a symbiotic relationship with each 
needing things the other can provide. However, the underlying values of 
state interest versus GCS‟s trans-border, humanitarianism and support for 
international organisations, especially the UN and its agencies, have also 
led to ideological and operational conflicts between state and GCS actors. 
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This study will also employ the Marxist post-colonial criticism of aid as a 
means of managing the “global borderland,”39 in suggesting that the aid 
and development agenda and therefore humanitarian relief and 
development NGOs are of great concern to developed western 
democracies for another reason, which is their own state security. As the 
nature of states and their relations with each other have altered, so have 
the security threats that states now face. The global uncivil society of 
internal wars, trans-national terrorism, organised criminal networks, 
environmental degradation, uncontrolled migration flows, HIV/AIDs, 
religious fundamentalism and trafficking in drugs, arms and people often 
result from failed states.40 Intervening powers, the UN and NGO activity 
that compromise a state‟s sovereignty also contribute to the problem. In 
this regard, Vanessa Pupavac has suggested “the weak state rather than 
the strong sovereign state is the problem that lies behind today‟s 
humanitarian crises.”41  Equally, the National Security Strategy of the US 
in 2002 recognised that it was failing states that presented the greatest 
threat to its own state security.42 
 
Therefore, this study examines three important themes. First, state 
involvement with IHNGOs will be expressed in the influence of funding by 
donor governments of IHNGOs and the concerns of western governments 
about their overseas policy, especially involving military and aid activity 
and how this is perceived domestically.  Second, GCS will be involved in 
the public position of individual IHNGOs and IHNGO networks towards the 
securitisation of aid exemplified by the role of the PRTs in Afghanistan, 
which are the agents of states with a realist agenda. This will be 
expressed in IHNGO policies, media campaigns, reports and press 
releases by individual IHNGOs and IHNGO coalitions. Third, both IHNGOs 
and the role of the military in aid and development work will be assessed 
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as to how both these sets of actors fit into the neo-Marxist theory that 
development and aid are merging with security to manage populations 
outside the developed world and therefore secure it from the 
consequences of failed states in the future.  
 
This paper argues that there has been an increasing convergence of 
IHNGO activity with that of the political and military objectives of 
intervening powers.  However, this coordination, initiated by both the 
military and IHNGOs in earlier interventions, is now being put under a lot 
of stress when IHNGOs and military forces intervene in seriously failed 
states such as has been the case of Somalia, and the present focus of this 
study, Afghanistan. In these states the basic structures of civil society and 
state governance have failed or are very weak following prolonged periods 
of civil war, ethnic division, famine and economic collapse.  These 
humanitarian crises generated by conflict are often referred to as complex 
emergencies.43  The difficulties for IHNGO military relations in Afghanistan 
arise from the tension between the state building agenda of the 
intervening military forces and the struggle for access to populations in 
need, and for the credible neutrality of IHNGOs who feel compromised by 
the military involvement in activities that have previously been their own 
domain. This is the cutting edge of the previously mentioned symbiotic and 
sometimes conflicting relationship between the political and military 
apparatus of intervening states and GCS actors such as IHNGOs. To be 
able to work, humanitarians need security and sometimes the 
considerable logistical support that military forces can provide; but they 
also need to be seen to be neutral and impartial. Governments need the 
moral high ground ostensibly supplied by humanitarian causes and their 
militaries need humanitarian assistance in post conflict reconstruction. In 
the case of Afghanistan, this study argues that the problem is exacerbated 
by an ongoing conflict, the paucity of civil society and governance 
structures especially security, in police and military terms, and the serious 
lack of Afghan government legitimacy. Added to this dilemma is a vicious 
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insurgency that rejects the stated impartiality of IHNGOs and sometimes 
targets them.  
 
Thesis statement 
The thesis of this study is that the development of military humanitarian 
interventions since the end of the Cold War has led to the conflation of 
military and humanitarian roles for military actors exemplified by the case 
of PRTs in Afghanistan and a consequent struggle for IHNGOs to 
reposition themselves in the humanitarian space they now share with the 
military. In terms of the theories outlined above, the realist agenda of 
states and their military forces, typified by PRTs, are competing for 
humanitarian space with the IHNGOs who represent the GCS approach. 
This has led to conflicting situations, sometimes cooperative, sometimes 
competitive, and at times leading to the borrowing of ideas and 
approaches from one another.  
 
IHNGO criticisms of military involvement in aid work frequently point to the 
increasing insecurity and attacks on NGOs as a result of the blurring of the 
lines between humanitarian and military actors. This study suggests this is 
symptomatic of a wider issue for IHNGOs, that of their involvement with 
state-building in a situation of ongoing conflict, such as in Afghanistan, that 
has compromised their neutrality, impartiality and independence and 
consequently their own security. This study will examine these 
complementary and conflicting issues to assess whether there is validity in 
the post-colonial criticism that IHNGOs have been co-opted into the 
security agenda of western states. 
 
The global war on terror (GWOT) and humanitarianism 
The US led Global War on Terror (GWOT) since 2001 has further blurred 
the boundaries between the “soft power of aid” and security, leading to 
“‟coherence‟ of military political and humanitarian responses to countries 
experiencing protracted crises of governance and underdevelopment”. 
18 
 
This is “the securitisation of aid.”44  The role of major IHNGOs in 
developing a politicised agenda in relation to interventions in the affairs of 
states prior to the GWOT also needs to be examined to put the current 
situation for IHNGOs in the case of Afghanistan into context.
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Chapter Three: Methodology 
Research focus 
The principle concern of this study is to assess the validity of the argument 
that major international humanitarian non-governmental organisations 
(IHNGOs) have become part of the security agenda of the developed 
western world in managing areas of the world experiencing extreme 
poverty and conflict. This study will assess the extent to which the 
selected IHNGOs conform to this thesis. 
 
IHNGOS and the security agenda of western developed states 
Five major international aid agencies, as opposed to local in country 
NGOs, have been chosen for this case study since they are more likely to 
reflect aspects of, or problems associated with, the securitisation of aid. 
These agencies, based in western developed nations, are more likely to 
either reflect this securitisation or be aware of or critical of it. It has been 
argued by some academics that this securitisation of aid is now an 
inherent feature of the wider policies of northern (western developed) 
governments towards zones of conflict and instability. This view sees 
development “as a technology of security.”1 IHNGOs form a significant part 
of humanitarian aid and development assistance through operating in 
partnerships with donor governments and the UN, and therefore, despite 
their non-governmental moniker, there is likely to be some coherence of 
IHNGOs with the security concerns of donor governments, their 
intervening military forces and the UN. 
 
The impact of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and other 
forms of military involvement with aid and reconstruction 
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), which are civil-military units 
deployed in Afghanistan (and Iraq), are also of significance to this study as 
they are the most salient example of military incursions into activities that 
were previously the domain of IHNGOs. Since they have been deployed 
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by US led Coalition Forces and NATO as part of the International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan with the intention of improving 
security and strengthening the reach of the Afghan central government, 2 
they represent the most overt manifestation of the use of aid and 
development in a security context. Therefore their impact on both the 
security situation in the country and on IHNGOs needs to be assessed.  
 
The rationale for this study 
Other studies of PRTs have assessed their effectiveness,3 and the internal 
civil-military relationships within them.4 Studies of the security issues 
facing NGOs in Afghanistan due to the shrinking of humanitarian space 
and the role of PRTs and other military actors in aid and reconstruction 
work have looked at the operational level of how the two groups impact 
on, cooperate or compete with and perceive each other.5  While there has 
been a lot written, especially from within the IHNGO community about the 
blurring of lines caused by military involvement in aid and development 
activities and how this has severely affected the security environment for 
aid workers,6 this study sees a gap in the literature for relating these 
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issues back to the wider theoretical concerns noted above; that is the 
extent to which IHNGOs and intervening militaries are both becoming part 
of a wider international security agenda for managing areas of instability in 
the world that has developed since the end of the Cold War. 
 
Sources 
The study will be based on analysis of secondary sources including books, 
academic journal articles, newspaper articles, reports, press releases and 
policy statements and information available from NGOs, intergovernmental 
and government websites. Requests for information were made to the 
major IHNGOs chosen for this study and personal communication from 
some people who have been involved in or observed the NGO-military 
relationship firsthand has been included with their permission. 
 
A case study approach 
This study will take a qualitative approach employing a case study of a 
specific example of the securitisation of aid. The case study approach has 
been chosen as it is flexible and useful for both theoretical and policy 
research.7 Since there is now quite a large body of literature on the subject 
of IHNGOs and their role in international relations plus studies on the 
impact of PRTs, both on security in Afghanistan and on the perceptions 
and functioning of IHNGOs, a selective case study is appropriate to isolate 
particular issues and processes that result from the interaction of these 
actors.8 A case study is useful in generalising findings to a particular 
theory9 which, in this paper, has been identified as the securitisation of aid. 
Although Afghanistan is the example in this case study, issues such as the 
increasing coherence between IHNGOs and intervening forces and the 
use of aid and reconstruction activities to advance political and military 
aims are applicable to the wider international arena. The issues that have 
compromised the stated neutrality and independence of IHNGOs are also 
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to be found in other areas of conflict, intervention and state-building in the 
world, for example, Iraq and Somalia. 
 
Afghanistan as a case study 
In this study Afghanistan is the case study and presents a current and 
relevant example of the issues facing IHNGOs due to the securitisation of 
aid. It has a long history of foreign intervention, conflict, poverty and 
corruption. It has never had a very strong central government and since it 
is currently the focus of a state-building project through international 
intervention, the place of aid and development agencies within that 
intervention will be a valuable indicator to assess the extent of their 
involvement in the wider international security agenda. A case study of this 
particularly difficult environment for IHNGOs will also help contribute to 
knowledge about the problems faced by IHNGOs in similar zones of 
conflict with inherent poverty and corruption such as Liberia, Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Colombia, Georgia, Lebanon, Haiti or the 
Philippines.10 These issues include the difficulties for IHNGOs in 
maintaining neutrality and independence whilst cooperating to some 
degree with intervening forces and host governments struggling for 
legitimacy, the adoption of aid and reconstruction activities by intervening 
military forces and the attempts of IHNGOs to reposition themselves as 
distinct from those activities carried out by political and military actors. This 
has subsequently led to the accusation from IHNGOs that aid and 
reconstruction activities by the military are blurring the lines between the 
two sets of actors and further compromising IHNGO security in terms of 
how they are perceived by civilians and armed opposition groups (AOGs).  
 
However, this study further suggests that coherence at a higher policy 
level between IHNGOs and the wider international community in the state 
building process, as in the example of Afghanistan, has also undermined 
IHNGO claims of neutrality and independence.  Another reason for 
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choosing Afghanistan is that it has represented the frontlines in the Global 
War on Terror (GWOT) since 2001. Therefore, the securitisation of aid as 
part of the wider security concern of intervening western states, the central 
concern of the thesis, is likely to be exhibited there. 
 
Criteria for the choice of IHNGOs for the study 
The five IHNGOs selected for this study are the International Committee of 
the Red Cross (ICRC), The International Rescue Committee (IRC), Oxfam, 
Medicins Sans Frontieres (MSF, also known as Doctors Without Borders) 
and Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE). Only five 
IHNGOs were chosen since to assess the large number of international 
aid agencies operating in Afghanistan, let alone the numerous national 
ones, was beyond the scope of a Master‟s thesis.11 These five 
organisations are all long standing, secular IHNGOs, based in either 
Europe or the US. Four of the five selected aid and development agencies 
have, since their inception, spread to have affiliated national member 
organisations in other states. The International Rescue Committee 
remains solely US based. There are 181 Red Cross and Red Crescent 
Societies around the world.  MSF has 18 national members, Oxfam has 11 
and CARE has 10. Most of these NGOs‟ national members are based in 
western and or developed donor states.12  
 
The ICRC and MSF are concerned with the provision of medical care and 
emergency aid in areas of conflict, but differ in their view about neutrality 
and silence regarding the conflicts in which they operate. The ICRC, 
based in Geneva, Switzerland, is the oldest agency concerned with 
humanitarian issues, having been in existence since the late 19th century.  
MSF is the most recent IHNGO, and has been in existence since the early 
1970s after being formed by French doctors who had split from the ICRC. 
Oxfam, the IRC and CARE are secular, humanitarian relief and 
development agencies. Since they carry out both emergency relief and 
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longer term development work they are multi-mandate agencies as 
opposed to the humanitarian emergency relief focus of the ICRC and 
MSF. Oxfam is UK based, while the IRC and CARE are US based. These 
organisations have been in existence since just before or during the 
Second World War. All five organisations have information about their 
activities, history and policies available through publications, policy 
statements, press releases and their web sites making them suitable for 
this study. Staff from the IRC and the ICRC provided some personal 
communication for this study, giving valuable insights into the current 
situation in Afghanistan and the difficulties facing IHNGOs. 
 
The central issue to be examined 
The central proposition for this study is that involvement with the wider 
international security agenda of major western states and the UN, 
exemplified by humanitarian intervention in failed or failing states, has 
compromised the neutrality, impartiality and independence of IHNGOs. 
This consequently presents a problem for their security in complex 
emergencies with ongoing conflict where they have become associated 
with internationally backed governments and intervening forces that are 
opposed by armed groups. While they attribute attacks on their staff to the 
blurring of roles caused by humanitarian aid and reconstruction activities 
conducted by intervening military forces, for example PRTs, IHNGOs may 
themselves have also become part of the securitisation of aid to manage 
unstable parts of the world. IHNGOs are part of a larger system of 
management for these regions that also includes UN agencies, intervening 
military forces and international organisations such as the World Bank that 
exists as a substitute for serious long-term political engagement with those 
regions from the developed world.  
 
While IHNGOs may attribute the loss of humanitarian space, neutrality, 
impartiality and independence to the actions of the military engaged in 
similar actions, this study argues further that the concern with the blurring 
of the lines is a symptom rather than the cause. Since the end of the Cold 
War, IHNGOs have been involved in interventions in failed and failing 
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states as a form of soft counter-insurgency, but the complex conflict in 
Afghanistan, wherein they have been attempting to distance themselves 
from this association, has brought their involvement in the international 
security agenda to the fore. The tension between short term emergency 
relief and longer term and politicised development is a likely fault line 
along which the IHNGOs may divide in terms of involvement with 
interventions and state-building. 
 
How the study will proceed 
The next chapter will provide an overview of humanitarian intervention 
since the end of the Cold War using four key examples (Somalia, Bosnia, 
Rwanda and Kosovo) and will reveal the IHNGO involvement with these 
interventions and the difficulties they have faced in dealing with complex 
intra-state conflicts. This will also identify the development of military 
involvement in aid and reconstruction activities and the difficulties faced by 
both IHNGO and military actors through involvement with, or attempting to 
engage in, the process of state building or rebuilding. 
 
Chapter five will examine the specific features of Afghanistan, its culture, 
geography and history to late 2001, to provide a setting for the current 
intervention and the particular problems this country presents to the aid 
community and the international military forces there in attempting to 
establish a working state.  
 
Chapter six outlines the IHNGOs that have been selected for this study, 
why they have been chosen, their history, their position on political and 
human rights issues and their sources of funding.  
 
Chapter seven examines the development of PRTs, their rationale in 
terms of security, aid and reconstruction, their composition, their activities 
and the criticism of them from within both the military and IHNGO 
communities. A focus of this chapter is the choice of using PRTs as part of 
the slow ISAF deployment in Afghanistan in the years following the fall of 
the Taliban regime. The example of the PRT‟s mixed security and 
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reconstruction roles, their limited effectiveness due to small numbers, the 
reluctance of troop contributing countries to put their troops in danger and 
their dependence on US air support lends credence to accusations of this 
being „peace- building lite.‟13 Within this paradigm the IHNGOs are 
operating in a severely compromised security situation and have become 
attached to the wider international intervention in the eyes of belligerents 
on all sides.  
 
Chapter eight examines the specific cases of the IHNGOs selected for this 
study in the period from late 2001 and the fall of the Taliban regime to the 
present day. Their activities, their ability to operate, their composition of 
expatriate and national staff, and their stance on political and security 
issues, including military involvement in aid and reconstruction, will be 
explored to assess the degree to which they do conform to the theory that 
they are part of the managerial security apparatus of the intervening 
western powers in Afghanistan. 
 
Chapter nine will draw out the main issues that have been examined in the 
IHNGO military relationship and in the IHNGO placement within the 
security agenda. Some suggestions will be put forward for ways the 
IHNGOs could manage involvement within international humanitarian 
intervention, and ways they might reposition themselves in relation to it.  
 
Chapter ten will conclude with an overview of the study and its main 
findings and some suggested areas for further study
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Chapter Four: Humanitarian Intervention 
Introduction 
Prior to the Global War on Terror (GWOT) that followed the events of 
September 11th 2001, the most comprehensive use of military forces in a 
humanitarian role had been undertaken in the Kosovo intervention in 
1999. The humanitarian interventions in Somalia in 1992 through to 
Kosovo in 1999 illustrate the development of IHNGO and military 
relationships and some of the major issues that have led to the problems 
currently faced by the IHNGOs in dealing with military involvement in 
humanitarian activities. The issues raised include security, neutrality and 
impartiality for IHNGOs, the tension between IHNGOs aligned with the UN 
and the military forces engaged in unilateral interventions by states that 
are major donors to IHNGOs, the differences in culture and knowledge 
between IHNGOs and the military, and the division between and within 
IHNGOs themselves regarding taking a political position on involvement 
with interventions. These are issues implicit in the difference between the 
state-based emphasis on power and national advancement of realism and 
the supposedly neutral, trans-border, supra-national (UN) concern with 
humanitarian values contained within GCS. 
 
Humanitarian military intervention was only made possible in the 1990s, 
with the end of the super power rivalry that had paralysed the UN Security 
Council during the Cold War. There had been previous examples of 
humanitarian intervention, such as the Berlin airlift at the outset of the Cold 
War which was an example of military forces being used to provide 
humanitarian aid.1 Equally, the operation had a political agenda in resisting 
the spread of Soviet influence. Political concerns were also always present 
in the more recent post-cold war humanitarian interventions that will be 
examined in this chapter. 
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A definition of humanitarian intervention 
A working definition of humanitarian intervention, must take into 
consideration that it is a rather slippery concept and the term 
„humanitarian‟ is frequently invoked by politicians for a host of reasons, not 
all of which are as altruistic as they may at first seem. Thomas Weiss and 
Cindy Collins point out that the concept of humanitarianism is challenged 
“by the motivations and actions of warring parties as well as by 
humanitarian actors.”2 J.L. Holzgrefe defines humanitarian intervention as 
“the threat or use of force across state borders by a state (or group of 
states) aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave violations of 
the fundamental human rights of individuals other than its own citizens, 
without the permission of the state within whose territory force is applied.”3  
 
IHNGOs and the ‘Agenda for Peace’ 
The securitisation of relief aid and reconstruction which has given rise to 
PRTs in the case of Afghanistan had its genesis in the humanitarian 
interventions of the 1990s. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
communist Eastern bloc, the scene was set for the involvement of NGOs 
within the peacemaking, peace-keeping and peace-building agendas of 
the post-Cold War UN. This was outlined in 1992 by then UN Secretary 
General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in his Agenda for Peace.4 The Agenda for 
Peace envisioned IHNGOs within, as Nicholas Stockton suggests, “a close 
partnership with an ambitious and expansive political project.”5 Military 
intervention into states by major powers in the name of humanitarian 
concerns became a feature of the post-Cold War era. Examples include 
Northern Iraq in 1991, Somalia in 1992, Bosnia from 1992 to 1995, and 
Kosovo and East Timor in 1999.6 IHNGOs have been involved in these 
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interventions, both in providing assistance for the inhabitants of these 
states as well as taking a position supporting or opposing the interventions 
and sometimes working in co-ordination with the intervening forces. For 
example, Oxfam called for intervention in Somalia,7 whereas MSF had 
opposed intervention in Somalia and Bosnia, but called for intervention in 
Rwanda.8  
 
The UN, state sovereignty and justifications for intervention 
Humanitarian military interventions are often not clear cut in terms of 
international law and the UN. This is one source of tension for many 
IHNGOs who subscribe to the rule of international law and the authority of 
the UN as opposed to unilateral intervention by one state or a coalition of 
states without UN authorisation. Between 1991 and 2000, the UN Security 
Council authorised seven interventions.  Five of these, Bosnia, Rwanda, 
Albania, Sierra Leone and East Timor, had host state consent so state 
sovereignty was not an issue.9 Somalia and Haiti were authorised by the 
UN without state consent, indicating that the UN had put humanitarian 
concerns ahead of state sovereignty, but the “unique nature” of these 
interventions was noted.10  
 
Human security as a justification for intervention 
The concept of human security that has developed in the last two decades 
underpins the supposed moral right of a state or group of states, or 
sometimes the UN, to intervene militarily in the internal affairs of another 
state. Human rights are central to the human security view of international 
relations and these rights are seen by those who support humanitarian 
interventions as now being more important than the previously accepted 
position of the state as the most important entity in international law. The 
sovereignty of a state from the GCS perspective is considered to be no 
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longer as important as that state‟s duty to protect its own citizens, 
therefore human security prioritises the security of people rather than 
states.11 This is usually invoked by intervening powers in a case of internal 
conflict in a state or failed state that is causing major crises such as 
genocide, famine or large scale displacement of populations. This view is 
at odds with the traditional realist state-centric prioritising of state 
sovereignty. 
 
The case of Kosovo in 1999 is an example of the ascendance of human 
security and human rights over state sovereignty. The ethnic cleansing of 
Kosovar Albanians from the then province of southern Serbia in the 
Republic of Yugoslavia was held as the justification for a coalition of 
states, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), to conduct an aerial 
bombing campaign on Serbia. At the time, it should be noted, some 
IHNGOs actively called for and coordinated with NATO in the 
intervention.12 It has been argued, however, that the intervention was 
undertaken by NATO due to its perceived inaction and compromised 
credibility, in a realist, state-based power sense, following its previous 
failure to prevent the earlier wars in Yugoslavia, especially in Bosnia.13 
However, humanitarian concerns were put to the fore in justifying the 
NATO action in bombing Yugoslavia. British Prime Minister Tony Blair 
even stated that it was a “war for human rights".14  This statement also 
indicates the slippery position for IHNGOs wherein their concerns 
regarding humanitarian issues can easily become politicised, or be seen to 
support a particular political or even military action.15  
 
A complex situation has developed as the clear cut lines of state 
sovereignty have sometimes been trumped by humanitarian concerns 
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championed by IHGNOs. These concerns, while often valid, can also be 
exploited for realist state-centric agendas. The situation in Afghanistan is 
an example where the intervening forces claim to champion concerns 
such as human and gender rights that are also central to some IHNGOs, 
yet, at the same time, the IHNGOs are trying to distance themselves from 
the political and military agenda of the intervening forces to retain 
acceptance with the local population and avoid being targeted by 
insurgents. 
 
IHNGO involvement in humanitarian interventions 
IHNGOs have taken a variety of positions in terms of their policy towards 
interventions in the last two decades. Their support for military intervention 
in situations such as Somalia, Bosnia and Kosovo has led to a situation 
where IHNGOs now find themselves working in co-ordination or in 
competition with the military forces of intervening powers in a situation 
such as in Afghanistan. For IHNGOs there is a tension between a need for 
security and for donor government support as well as attempting to appear 
neutral and impartial. The increasing role of military forces in supposedly 
humanitarian roles such as providing emergency aid and longer term 
reconstruction projects have had impacts on the IHNGOs involved in the 
same activities in the same regions. The humanitarian interventions of the 
1990s were where the groundwork was laid that would lead to the present 
day issues for IHNGOs and PRTs over humanitarian space in 
Afghanistan.  These issues include security, donor government funding, 
state and IHNGO relations with the UN, the types of aid provided, 
positioning on issues, differences in organisational culture, and respective 
knowledge and competencies between IHNGOs and PRTs.  
 
Each of the humanitarian interventions of the 1990s differs from its 
predecessors or contemporaries and the lessons learned were not always 
applicable in another situation. This is also worth noting since differences 
in geography, economy, history, culture, religion and the internal and 
international political context of an intervention will all have a major 
influence on the nature of the humanitarian intervention, its duration, and 
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its success or failure. To this end the influence of these factors in 
Afghanistan will be outlined in chapter four. 
 
It is therefore worth examining the background to and IHNGO involvement 
with four of the major interventions of the 1990s, before the GWOT started 
in 2001. Peter Hoffman and Thomas Weiss identify the events in Somalia, 
Bosnia, Rwanda and Kosovo as the four “key traumas of the 1990s”.16 
These will be examined to trace the development of IHNGO and military 
relations.  
 
Somalia 
Somalia in the Horn of Africa had been a client state of both the Soviets 
and, later, the US during the Cold War. The dictatorship of President Siad 
Barre ended in early 1991 when he was overthrown by a coalition of 
Somali warlords, who immediately started fighting each other for territory 
and resources.17 Drought and civil war rapidly laid waste to the country, 
especially in the south, with one third of the population estimated to be at 
risk from starvation in 1992.18 The few aid agencies operating at that time 
in the failing state found their resources being pillaged to supply the 
militias while the starving population went without.  The few remaining aid 
agencies hired armed guards which really amounted to paying protection 
money to warlords.19  
 
International attention, generated through news media coverage, 
especially on TV, and calls for action from NGOs such as that by Phillip 
Johnson of CARE,20 led to a UN authorised UN Mission in Somalia 
(UNOSOM 1) arriving  in April 1992 and a US led Unified Task Force 
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(UNITAF) to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid arriving in December 
1992. TV cameras were waiting on the beaches when US marines 
landed,21 and also when former founding member of MSF, Bernard 
Kouchner, theatrically waded ashore with a sack of rice on his back.22 TV 
cameras were also there when dead US servicemen were dragged 
through the streets of Mogadishu in October 1993 after an unsuccessful 
attempt to capture leading members of a faction led by Somali warlord, 
Mohamed Farah Aideed. The Clinton administration withdrew US forces 
soon after.23 
 
IHNGOs in the Somalia intervention 
The ICRC remained active in Somalia during the chaos of 1991-1992, a 
period when most other aid agencies had left due to the security situation. 
However, it hired and paid (in rice) armed guards with a consequent loss 
of 20 percent of its supplies in 1992.24 Oxfam had withdrawn from Somalia 
in 1990, and was late to return in 1992. Upon their return, Oxfam were 
also initially forced to employ armed guards, prior to the military 
intervention.25 Oxfam was slow to get involved with the intervention, but 
eventually broke with a long pacifist tradition in calling for and supporting 
intervention in Somalia.26 MSF had opposed the intervention in Somalia 
and had argued that the intervening military forces, considering the 
complex and factionalised situation there, would end up engaged in 
“making war upon them (the people of Somalia), even if it did so in the 
name of halting a famine.”27 Their predictions were realised in the fighting 
during 1993 between Somali warlords and the forces of UNOSOM. CARE 
actively lobbied for the military intervention. In October 1992, Philip 
Johnston, president of CARE, organised “a security co-ordination 
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mechanism for all NGOs, and this became the US-led Civilian-Military 
Operations Center (CMOC).”28 This is an early example of co-ordination 
between IHNGOs and military forces in a complex emergency. The IRC 
like fellow US based IHNGO CARE, and other NGOs belonging to the US 
NGO coalition Inter Action, advocated for the intervention through a 
petition to the US National Security Advisor in November 1992.29 The IRC 
carried out food delivery in 1993, but also concentrated on water, 
sanitation and income generation programmes.30 
 
The forces of the military intervention were able to establish security 
allowing the delivery of aid alleviating the famine which was the original 
humanitarian objective.31 The IHNGOs, however, proved difficult for the 
UN to bring together under one organisational umbrella, both in terms of 
working with each other and in coordinating with the military for their own 
security.32 They were often also competing with each other for attention 
and resources.33 The difficulty in getting IHNGOs to coordinate with the 
military also came from IHNGO concerns about losing their close contacts 
with the local population.34 However, the political state-building objectives 
set by the UN for UNOSOM II undermined any initial success in 
establishing security for humanitarian agencies. The attempts to disarm 
and neutralise Aideed, in an attempt to remove a spoiler in the failing 
peace negotiations, led to the fighting that precipitated the US and 
ultimately UN withdrawal.35  Revenge attacks by Aideed‟s supporters, who 
perceived UNOSOM II, and therefore IHNGOs involved with the UN, as 
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having now taken sides in the conflict, included an attack on aid workers 
from the IHNGO World Vision.36  
 
The Somalia crisis revealed the difficulty for the UN of coordinating 
military, political and humanitarian actors with competing goals, agendas 
and organisational structures.37  The intervention in Somalia and the 
disparate operations and responses of humanitarian agencies was seen 
by some observers as an example of the need for better coordination of 
NGOs in such emergencies.38 Resolving these problems would lead in the 
future to integrated missions and the development of political, military and 
humanitarian coherence. Although the UN in the Somalia intervention did 
not coordinate civil-military relations with NGOs as a whole, some 
individual troop contributing countries did. For example, Australian forces 
in Baidoa developed a Civil-Military Operations Team (CMOT).39 
 
Since the intervention of the early 1990s, many IHNGOs including CARE, 
MSF and Oxfam have relocated their base of operations outside Somalia, 
often to Nairobi in neighbouring Kenya, and few expatriate staff can work 
in Somalia due to continuing violence and insecurity. In October 2007 the 
situation had deteriorated so much that IHNGOs including CARE, Oxfam, 
Save the Children UK and World Vision International issued a joint 
statement regarding the lack of security and consequent lack of access to 
populations in need of assistance.40 The ICRC continues operations in 
Somalia through the local Somali Red Crescent Society.41 
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The intervention in Somalia had started out as a humanitarian venture, but 
the political agenda of state-building undertaken by UNOSOM II without 
sufficient force to back it up ultimately undermined the humanitarian 
operation. The ensuing withdrawal of UN forces resulted in a fragmented 
and failed state with no effective central government and a dire security 
situation that exists to this day. As the first humanitarian intervention of the 
post Cold War era, Somalia had revealed the difficulties of getting the 
humanitarians and the intervening military to coordinate. The advocacy for 
intervention, as exemplified by CARE, demonstrated that NGOs could 
influence state policy. This would lead to an exaggerated belief by some 
NGOs in their ability to influence events as later interventions would 
reveal. However, the first steps towards closer coordination were taken in 
the development of civil-military cooperation (CMC). It also revealed the 
dangers for IHNGO operations and their supposed neutrality when they 
were aligned with an intervening military in a failed state-building 
operation. 
 
Bosnia 1992-1995 
The disintegration of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s has been dealt with in 
detail elsewhere,42 but the war in Bosnia between the competing Bosnian 
Serb, Bosnian Muslim and Croat forces was the conflict that drew major 
international humanitarian attention and faltering UN intervention. Two 
important innovations in the relationship of military forces with 
humanitarian agencies that emerged in Bosnia were humanitarian 
corridors and UN safe havens. The effort to keep Sarajevo airport open for 
delivery of humanitarian aid and defending aid convoys exemplified the 
former.43 The UN abandonment of the safe havens at Srebrenica and 
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Zepa in 1995 made the latter an infamous black mark against the UN.44 
The United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) proved to be seriously 
compromised by the inadequate troop numbers provided to carry out its 
mandate,45 and the unwillingness of the US to become involved militarily 
for fear of being dragged into the quagmire of the Balkan wars following 
the debacle in Somalia.46 The humanitarian focus of the UN and NATO 
roles until late in the war, in 1995, has been interpreted by some 
commentators as an alternative action allowing them to avoid serious 
military and political engagement to resolve the crisis which, in turn, 
undermined their credibility in attempting to bring the warring factions to a 
negotiated settlement.47 
 
The Bosnian crisis led to some innovations in terms of humanitarian 
actions by the military and in civil-military relations between UN forces and 
humanitarian agencies.  In 1993 a Civil-Military Operations Centre 
(CMOC) was established in Bosnia to facilitate information sharing and 
coordination of UN agencies, NGOs and the military. This was a major 
innovation that has been employed in subsequent peace operations.48 
However, NGO-military relations were often strained by the difficulties 
faced by UNPRFOR in “conducting a peacekeeping operation in the 
middle of a war.”49 As in Somalia, UNPROFOR troops protected aid 
convoys, which sometimes led to resentment from opposing factions and 
consequently attacks on aid convoys and humanitarian workers from 
paramilitary groups from all sides.50  
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IHNGOs in Bosnia 
Due to these issues, as well as their stated impartiality, neutrality and 
contemporary experience in Somalia, the ICRC organised independent 
transportation and distanced themselves from UNPRFOR protection.51 
However, attacks on humanitarian workers were another feature of 
internal wars fought by paramilitary or criminal groups that became evident 
in Bosnia. The ICRC withdrew from the country between May 1992 and 
late 1993 after one of its officials was killed by an attack on a convoy.52 
Other major IHNGOS became subcontracting implementing partners to the 
UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and donor governments, 
and the number of international NGOs in the former Yugoslavia increased 
to 91 in 1993, while only 12 NGOs operated in Serbia, which furthered the 
perception that they were not impartial or neutral from the Serbian 
perspective.53 For example, CARE undertook a major water purification 
project in Sarajevo funded by the Canadian government in 1994.54 Events 
in Bosnia also revealed differences between the ICRC and MSF. The 
ICRC knew of the existence of Serb controlled concentration camps 
holding Muslim prisoners but did not reveal this at the time, although they 
were later revealed by journalists.55 MSF was present at the fall of the UN 
safe haven of Srebrenica and later called for an enquiry into the events 
surrounding it that implicated the French government.56  The IRC initially 
operated in Sarajevo in 1992, later it expanded to other centres in Bosnia. 
The IRC provided medicine, food and assisted with the evacuation of 
refugees.57 From 1992, the IRC also operated in Serbia and Montenegro 
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with Serb refugees fleeing from the Bosnian and Croatian wars.58 Oxfam 
entered Bosnia in 1993 and concentrated on supplying clothing to the 
many internally displaced people. However, the refugees from Srebrenica 
were often more in need of counselling, emotional support and information 
about family members following the extreme trauma they had 
experienced.59 
 
The example of second hand clothing provided to people traumatised and 
displaced by a vicious civil war sums up a frequent criticism of the 
humanitarian intervention in Bosnia. The argument is that UNRPFOR, the 
UNHCR and the accompanying IHNGOs were providing the international 
community with an alternative to real political and military action to resolve 
the crisis; “the politics of rescue over policy,”60 “a fig leaf for political and 
military inaction.”61 The bitter experiences of the interventions in Bosnia 
and Somalia would influence UN and US decision making in the crisis that 
emerged in Rwanda in 1994. 
 
Rwanda and the African Great Lakes crisis  
Underlying ethnic and political tensions, a legacy of Belgian colonial rule, 
set the scene for the Rwandan genocide of 1994 perpetrated by Hutu 
militias upon Tutsi and moderate Hutus.62 The tiny military presence of the 
United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) proved 
completely unable to prevent the slaughter of 800 000 people between 
April and July 1994, while the international community, including the UN, 
stood by.63 The French „Operation Turquoise‟ had UN authorisation, but 
came too late to stop the genocide.64 In France, the media and NGOs 
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including MSF had advocated military intervention.  MSF, which had 
opposed intervention in Somalia and Bosnia, argued that the solution 
required political and military action rather than just humanitarian 
assistance.65 The UN and US inaction on Rwanda, exemplified by the 
Clinton administration‟s careful avoidance of the word genocide so as to 
not be obliged to act under the UN genocide convention,66 is believed to 
have been a reaction to the recent (October 1993) debacle in Somalia.67 
The Tutsi led Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) retook most of Rwanda from 
the Hutu government in July 1994 and this in turn led to a massive 
displacement of one and a half million Hutu refugees along with those 
responsible for the killing, many of whom crossed into Eastern Zaire (later 
the Democratic Republic of Congo, DRC).68 
 
IHNGO involvement in Rwanda and Zaire/DRC 
At the onset of the carnage in early April 1994 most IHNGOs and agencies 
of the UN left the country. A notable exception was the ICRC which stayed 
on throughout the crisis.69 The few MSF workers left in the country joined 
forces with the ICRC.70 It was to the Hutu refugee camps in Eastern Zaire 
around Goma and Bukavu that humanitarian intervention was finally 
directed. The belated US led Operation Support Hope (OSH) was a 
military humanitarian operation and was coordinated by a CMOC which 
coordinated the activities of the military with NGOs and UN agencies.71 
OSH, along with UNAMIRII, did improve security for IHNGOs who were, 
however, confronted with the problem that the aid they were now able to 
deliver was feeding killers from the Rwandan genocide as well as innocent 
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civilians.72 Some IHNGOs including the IRC and MSF (France) withdrew 
from the camps because of this issue in 1995.73  
 
Co-ordination between UN agencies, IHNGOs and the military of OSH 
were considered to be “much improved on the Somalia experience.”74 In 
the Rwandan capital, Kigali, the UN Rwandan Emergency Office (UNREO) 
was established by the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) in 
the same location as the CMOC established by the US military. Liaison 
with IHNGOs was carried out through this centre.75 Military personnel also 
provided logistical, information and transport support for UN agencies and 
IHNGOs. This even extended, in one case, to Irish soldiers wearing the T 
shirts of Goal, an Irish NGO, while carrying out work for them.76 
 
Military–NGO co-ordination during the period of OSH in July to September 
of 1994 and UNAMIR II from July 1994 to March 1996 presents evidence 
of the developing relationship between the two. In terms of a humanitarian 
intervention, UNAMIR I and most NGOs were powerless to do anything 
except stand aside or evacuate during the genocide. It should be noted 
that some NGOs were sending warnings of the impending genocide to the 
UN that went unheeded.77 The aid delivered to the camps for Hutu 
refugees in Eastern Zaire had the unfortunate effect of also assisting the 
perpetrators of the genocide who then contributed to further instability, 
eventually contributing to the civil war in DRC.78  
 
The situation in the camps in Zaire demonstrated that belligerent parties 
would attempt to manipulate IHNGOs and their aid for military and political 
ends. The ICRC remained due to their neutral and impartial stance 
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regarding victims of violence. Representatives of CARE UK were divided 
about whether to pull out or remain in the camps.79 Oxfam also debated 
pulling out but decided to remain in the camps due to the importance of 
water treatment, a speciality of Oxfam, to avoid cholera in the camps.80 
CARE, Oxfam and MSF (3 sections, not France) all signed a petition 
threatening withdrawal unless security and access to those in need 
improved. 81 The exiled Hutu regime in the camps then quelled the 
violence since the withdrawal of IHNGOs would have compromised the 
regime‟s attempts to gain international standing and its ability to negotiate 
with the new government of Rwanda.82  
 
The late military intervention following the initial political inaction in the 
case of Rwanda led to aid being delivered to militarised refugee camps. 
This confronted IHNGOs with a dilemma about impartiality or deciding 
between „deserving‟ and „undeserving‟ victims and the contribution of 
humanitarian aid in fuelling or prolonging conflicts.83 
 
Kosovo 
Kosovo was, until the events of 1999, the southernmost province of Serbia 
in the rump state of the former Yugoslavia. It shares a border with Albania, 
Montenegro and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). 
However, the population of Kosovo consisted of 90 percent ethnic Kosovar 
Albanians vastly outnumbering the Serbian minority.84 Violence escalated 
in the late 1990s as fighters of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and 
Serbian forces clashed, provoking a major Serb military crackdown which 
ultimately led to military intervention by NATO in 1999, resulting in an 
exodus of an estimated 820,000 refugees into Macedonia and Albania.85 
Following the end of the NATO bombing campaign, the Kosovar refugees 
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returned and reprisals provoked another refugee outflow of 230,000 Serb 
and Roma refugees into Serbia.86  Unlike the interventions in Somalia, 
Bosnia and Rwanda, the NATO intervention in Kosovo did not have UN 
authorisation.87 This had implications for the stated neutrality and 
impartiality of IHNGOs, many of whom were based in the UK or US which 
were the lead nations in NATO involved in this operation. Following the 
Serb withdrawal, the NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR) occupied the province 
and divided responsibility for the five different regions of the province 
between the individual national military forces of NATO.88 This 
arrangement has a similarity with the PRTs of contributing nations within 
ISAF in the current deployment in Afghanistan, with each nation‟s PRT 
having responsibility for a particular province. Compared to earlier 
interventions, the Kosovo conflict revealed IHNGOs had increasing 
misgivings about the deployment of military forces in a humanitarian role. 
 
Military involvement in humanitarian relief in Kosovo 
Despite the claimed humanitarian motives for the NATO intervention in 
Kosovo, there was less overt public support from major IHNGOs than had 
been the case in Somalia, Bosnia or Rwanda, and more questioning of the 
motives, effectiveness and implications for humanitarianism of the 
operation afterwards.89 The UNHCR, the coordinating body for many 
major humanitarian agencies, was underprepared for the refugee flow into 
Macedonia that increased with the onset of the bombing campaign. This 
was partly due to the UNHCR not wishing to signal the expectation of the 
size of the refugee flow to the Milosevic regime in Yugoslavia or to alarm 
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authorities in Macedonia where a large proportion of the refugees would 
go.90 In April 1999, early in the NATO bombing campaign, Sadako Ogata, 
the then UN High Commissioner for Refugees, asked NATO to coordinate 
humanitarian relief for Kosovar refugees.91 For the first time, the UNHCR 
accepted direct military assistance. Most donor government aid (from the 
intervening powers), however, was directed bilaterally through national aid 
agencies and military channels.92  NATO forces rather than NGOs initially 
took over the humanitarian relief operations in neighbouring Albania and 
Macedonia.93 Sometimes, as a result of an emphasis on the transport and 
logistical strengths of the military and a lack of humanitarian aid 
experience in complex emergencies, there were inappropriate types of aid, 
air drops in the wrong locations, a lack of information about the health of 
refugees, little aid to Serb refugees and a lack of transparency about 
expenditure.94  Regardless of these shortcomings, this indicates the 
readiness by 1999, compared to the start of the decade, of military forces 
to engage directly in humanitarian activities as part of their operations.  
 
IHNGOs in the Kosovo intervention 
Nearly all IHNGOs withdrew from Kosovo ahead of the NATO bombing 
campaign that lasted from March to June of 1999. The ICRC was the only 
agency able to gain access to provide aid to victims of the NATO bombing 
in Serbia as well as Kosovo during the conflict. This was due in part to its 
neutral stance and silence about Serb atrocities in Kosovo.95 The dangers 
were still present; an ICRC vehicle struck a landmine in Kosovo, killing an 
Albanian doctor and wounding two others.96 CARE was forced to withdraw 
just prior to the bombing campaign due to the deteriorating security 
situation. A representative of CARE Australia, Steve Pratt, was imprisoned 
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for five months by Serb authorities, supposedly for spying.97 This was a 
very clear indication of the suspicion about the lack of neutrality that some 
NGOs faced. During 1998 MSF tried to draw attention to the Serb 
atrocities and conditions in refugee camps.98 MSF was also forced to 
leave just after the start of hostilities, partly due to harassment by Serb 
security and paramilitary forces for the perception they were close to a 
Kosovar Albanian NGO, the Mother Teresa Society.99 The IRC advocated 
the use of force against Serbia100 and, with US government financial 
support, carried out food drops to civilians in Kosovo from the air in 
defiance of Serbian threats to shoot down the planes.101 With the return to 
Kosovo of Albanian refugees from Macedonia and Albania in the summer 
of 1999 the IRC provided clean water, clothing, cooking supplies and 
reconstruction assistance.102 It was less troubled about the ideological and 
ethical concerns regarding the humanitarian military intervention than was 
the UK based Oxfam which struggled with establishing a position 
regarding the military intervention. It had recommended the use of the 
„threat of force‟ to British foreign secretary, Robin Cook, in 1998 prior to 
the war.103 Later as the bombing was underway, Oxfam adopted a 
pragmatic approach, assisting in the refugee camps but avoiding making a 
public statement supporting the intervention so as to avoid danger to their 
staff still in Serbia, or opposing it and putting them at odds with the UK 
government and NATO, who they had to work with on the ground.104  
 
IHNGO reactions to the military involvement in humanitarian aid 
Some British based IHNGOs made an effort to avoid direct involvement 
with their military in the refugee crisis in the surrounding countries. The 
ICRC (UK) resisted Department for International Development (DFID) 
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requests to take on a refugee camp run by the British military in Albania.105 
CARE UK also raised funds publicly for its Kosovo operation so as to 
avoid donor government influence and assert its claim of impartiality.106 
MSF also lobbied against the sidelining of the UNHCR, which resulted in 
certain fundamental relief functions, especially the registration of refugees, 
not being carried out, as well as refusing NATO funding or working with 
the NATO run camps.107 MSF also claimed that despite the huge financial 
and logistical resources behind the NATO built camps, the majority of 
Kosovar refugees were housed locally by the civilian population.108 Oxfam 
called for greater co-ordination and coherence between NATO, UNHCR, 
donor governments and NGOs, especially with regard to refugee camps 
being established by donor governments and their militaries outside of 
UNHCR control. Oxfam was supportive of the use of NATO resources for 
logistics and transport, but urged UNHCR management of the refugee 
camps.109 
 
Conclusion 
The history of military and IHNGO involvement in humanitarian 
interventions since the end of the Cold War reveals a relationship that has 
been at times complimentary and at others difficult or even conflicted. In 
Somalia the need for security led IHNGOs to seek military involvement to 
support the delivery of aid. In Bosnia IHNGOs were supported in delivering 
aid by a military force that did not have a mandate to stop the war or 
enforce a political settlement. In the Rwanda/African Great Lakes crisis the 
early imperative for military action to avert genocide was missed and the 
later intervention risked providing aid to those who carried out the 
genocide. In Kosovo military forces carried out humanitarian aid work 
while IHNGOs were conflicted about being involved with the war and its 
lack of UN authorisation and the consequent sidelining of the UNHCR.  
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The early example of active lobbying by some IHNGOs for military action 
in humanitarian emergencies, for example, CARE in Somalia110 and 
Oxfam in Bosnia,111 has been replaced by a concern on the part of 
IHNGOs about a loss of neutrality, co-option for political agendas and a 
loss of humanitarian space.112 Nonetheless, since the Somalia and Bosnia 
interventions, IHNGOs and military forces have combined their actions 
more closely, especially through the military initiative of civil-military co-
ordination and communications centres and staff dedicated to these tasks.  
 
IHNGOs now also undertake development work, governance and capacity 
building programmes that support the state-building process, and this 
involves them politically as implementing partners for intervening states 
and new internationally backed governments. For example, today in 
Kosovo all of CARE‟s programmes deal with longer term issues that relate 
to state development such as democratisation, conflict resolution, 
economic growth and regional development.113   
 
Oxfam‟s recommendation for the military to use its logistical advantages in 
the Kosovar refugee camps but to leave management of the camps to the 
UNHCR echoes current calls by IHNGOs for the military to concentrate on 
security in Afghanistan, but to let the IHNGOs provide aid and 
development assistance. This attempt by IHNGOs to fence off certain 
parts of aid work from military involvement but advocate for it in others is a 
recurring theme. 
 
Issues in the IHNGO- military (GCS-Realist) relationship since 1990 
Major themes that have come to the fore in the era of post Cold War 
humanitarian interventions include the tension between the need for 
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security that can be provided for humanitarian workers and those in need 
of their assistance by the military of intervening forces and the desire of 
major IHNGOs to maintain impartiality and neutrality. The incidence of 
unilateral or coalition interventions such as in Kosovo and more recently in 
Iraq also demonstrate the divide between the UN and its agencies such as 
the UNHCR, with whom IHNGOs have worked in the past, and the 
militaries of non-UN authorised interventions as mentioned above. This 
also extends into the IHNGO emphasis on non state-centric GCS 
concerns such as human rights, human security and international 
humanitarian law. These are concerns for which IHNGOs have aligned 
themselves with the UN, and for which some, such as the ICRC, Oxfam, 
CARE and MSF have consultative status with the UN. However, the UN, 
as an international force, has often been sidelined by the US and its allies 
in the GWOT and it has become a target for opponents of the US since 
2003 in Iraq and Afghanistan.  
 
Another tension is present in the cultures of IHNGOs compared with that 
of military forces and the respective strengths of the two sets of actors. 
The military have advantages in terms of transportation, security and 
logistics, while IHNGOs possess knowledge about the needs of those they 
are assisting and they often have longer-term involvement in the theatre of 
operations compared to the shorter length of military tours of duty.114   
 
Within the IHNGO community there is debate about the development of a 
so called „new humanitarianism‟.115 This debate tends to divide between 
those who see an active political role in promoting human rights, 
democracy and liberalism as part of IHNGO activity and those who 
maintain the ICRC line of total neutrality and impartiality, even if this 
means being silent about human rights abuses and providing aid to all 
sides in a conflict regardless of perceptions of deserving and undeserving 
                                            
114
 Thomas R. Mockaitis, „Reluctant Partners: Civil Military Co-operation in Kosovo‟, Small 
Wars and Insurgencies 15, (2004), 38-69. 
115
 Mark Duffield, Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development 
and Security (London: Zed Books, 2001), pp.75-107; Fiona Fox, „New Humanitarianism: 
Does it provide a Moral Banner for the 21
st
 Century?‟ Disasters,25 (4) (2001), 275-289. 
49 
 
victims.116 This indicates the fracture lines within the humanitarian 
movement as a whole about its flirtation with the power wielded by states; 
a power which has at times been used to advance humanitarian ends, but 
at other times, it has been the humanitarian cause that has been used to 
advance the political interests and agendas of states. 
 
The example of Kosovo, the last (apart from the UN authorised 
intervention in East Timor) humanitarian intervention of the 20th century, 
may have led both IHNGOs and the military to believe that unilateral 
action and civil-military co-ordination would be effective in future 
interventions, where IHNGOs and military forces could provide relief aid 
and development in support of peace and state-building. However, the 
conflict was in Europe, it was won exclusively by NATO air power to avoid 
casualties to personnel,117 the per capita aid budget to Kosovo following 
the war was very high118 and the land area to be occupied by a large 
ground force was small.119 Although it may have seen the growth of 
military involvement in humanitarian emergencies and the questioning of 
humanitarian agencies about where they stood in these events, it was also 
an atypical case relative to the situation in parts of Africa or South Asia, 
such as in Afghanistan.
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Chapter Five: The Context of Afghanistan to 2001 
 
Given that the specific nature of the war and reconstruction in Afghanistan 
since 2001 differs from previous interventions, it is important that a 
cultural, geographical, political and historical background is given to 
provide a context to the current environment in which the IHNGOs and 
intervening military forces operate in Afghanistan. 
Culture, ethnicity, religion and language 
Afghanistan‟s existence as a state has largely relied on Islam to supply 
some cohesion to the ethnic groups that constitute it. The largest and most 
dominant ethnic group is the Pashtuns in the south and east of the country 
who make up about half the population.1 The Durand line that marks the 
border between Pakistan and Afghanistan is straddled by the Pashtun 
people. This ethnic group is divided by this border so they are 
approximately equal in number in southern Afghanistan and in the North 
West Frontier Provinces of Pakistan.2 The next largest ethnic group, 
Tajiks, make up about one fifth of the population and are mostly 
concentrated in the north and west.  A linguistic divide exists between 
these two groups although many Pashtun can also speak Dari, a variant of 
Persian that is spoken by Tajiks, as a second language.3 Other ethnic 
groups include the Hazaras who live in the central part of the country and 
who are Shia Muslims, which puts them at odds with the Sunni Muslims of 
the majority.4 Smaller minorities ethnicities represented in the central 
Asian republics to the north include Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz and 
Turkmen.5 
Geography 
Afghanistan is a large and mountainous country. The largest mountains 
are in the east, spreading out into mountain ranges and valleys to the 
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west, with deserts in the south and north.6 This factor, alongside its large 
size of 652,230 square kilometres,7 has made it a notoriously difficult 
country for invading forces, whether the occupying armies of Alexander 
the Great in 330BC, the British in the 19th century, the Soviets in the 1980s 
or the US and its NATO allies in the present day. When compared to the 
ostensibly successful military humanitarian interventions of the 1990s in 
Timor or Kosovo, Afghanistan‟s geography is significant for its larger size, 
and difficult terrain of mountains and deserts. This is a challenge to both 
military intervention and the operations of IHNGOs in terms of travel, 
communications and the potential for ambush. 
Geopolitics and Afghanistan 
Afghanistan‟s past has been marked by successive invasions due to its 
location between Russia, India (and now Pakistan), China and Persia 
(Iran) as it has been a corridor for invading armies into the Indian sub-
continent, a buffer between the British and Russian empires in the 19th 
century and a Cold War battlefield in the 1980s. Today it is often 
considered the front line in the GWOT, pitting the US and its allies against 
Islamic extremists. Its recent history has been shaped by very realist state 
concerns, especially those of the US and USSR in the 1980s and regional 
powers such as Pakistan and Iran. Barnett Rubin has stated that 
Afghanistan has been “shaped by its interaction with the modern state 
system.”8 Afghanistan‟s internal political history as a state, however, has 
been typified by only a weak sense of national unity and governments able 
to administer the urban centres but with very limited control over the 
conservative countryside and little success in improving health and 
education in those areas.9 Some degree of national unity has usually been 
most evident in resistance to invaders.  
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Major features of Afghanistan’s modern History 
The 18th and 19th Centuries 
In the mid 18th century conquests by a Pashtun warrior chief, Ahmad Shah 
Durrani, began the process that led to a recognisable Afghan state.10 
During the 19th century, the British Empire came into contact with the 
Afghan tribes as the British took control of India. The British also became 
concerned about the expanding Russian empire to the north, and Persian 
Empire to the west, of Afghanistan, which was the area that separated 
these competing empires. The Afghan wars of 1839-43 and 1879-1881 
were both fought by the British to prevent Russian influence or control 
over Afghanistan.11 It was 19th century geopolitics that influenced events in 
Afghanistan at this time, especially the decline of the Ottoman Empire and 
the consequent expansion of the Russian and British empires into Central 
Asia and the Indian subcontinent respectively.12  
 
20th Century attempts at reform 
In the first half of the 20th century, Afghan monarchs attempted to 
introduce some modernising reforms.13 However, apart from 
improvements in the armed forces, other attempted advances in health, 
education and the welfare of women rarely extended beyond the main 
cities and often met with resistance from the traditional and conservative 
Islamic culture. King Amanullah, who ruled from 1919-1929, was the most 
ambitious in this respect, but he was eventually deposed for advocating 
ambitious social reforms including a proposal for universal education for 
women.14  
 
After the Second World War and the partition of British India into separate 
Indian and Pakistani states, Afghanistan began to move into the Soviet 
sphere of influence. The creation of the state of Pakistan resurrected long 
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standing issues about the status of Pashtun tribal areas and the disputed 
Durrand line between Afghanistan and Pakistan.15 During the Cold War, 
Afghanistan‟s governments proved adept at obtaining aid from both the 
US and USSR. US military aid to its new Cold War ally, Pakistan, 
combined with disinterest in Afghanistan in the 1950s helped to increase 
Soviet influence in Afghanistan.16 The development of a university in Kabul 
and the training of educated Afghan elites and military officers in the 
USSR also helped establish a small communist movement that would 
eventually take power in a coup in 1978.17  
 
Soviet Invasion 
Following the 1978 coup, the communist Khalq party attempted sweeping 
social reforms that met with armed resistance and they started to lose 
control of parts of the country. This situation was made worse by internal 
disputes and assassinations within the ruling party.18 Soviet concern about 
the consequences for their own Islamic republics of the precedent set by a 
possible Islamic takeover in Afghanistan, as had occurred in Iran,19 and 
the possibility of a new government in the buffer state of Afghanistan that 
may have been friendly to the US,20 prompted the invasion of December 
1979. Afghan Islamist resistance fighters, the mujahedeen, were actively 
encouraged and assisted by the US through Pakistan and its Inter 
Services Intelligence agency (ISI) resulting in seven resistance groups 
being fostered by Pakistan.21 The Soviet invasion proved costly, as the 
mujahedeen with US and Pakistani backing managed to deny the Soviet 
and Afghan armies control of the countryside. The US supplied „stinger‟ 
missiles turned the tide in the mujahedeen‟s favour from 1986.22 The 
Soviets withdrew in 1989, but continued to supply the communist 
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government in Afghanistan, which held out until 1992 when, following the 
end of Soviet aid, the mujahedeen captured Kabul and then virtually 
destroyed it in the following years as the various ethnic factions fought 
each other for control.23  
 
Civil war and the rise of the Taliban 
This state of intermittent civil war continued among the competing 
mujahedeen groups until the rise of the Taliban. The Taliban had started in 
the southern province of Kandahar with Pakistani military assistance,24 
captured Kabul in 1996 and eventually gained control of 90 percent of the 
country by 2001.25 The Taliban regime was notorious for its hard line 
interpretation of Islamic Sharia law and repressive edicts on women, 
enforcing strict dress codes and denying them access to employment, 
education and health care which led to conflict with the UN and some 
IHNGOs.26  
 
The fall of the Taliban in late 2001 
Taliban relations with the international community and especially the US 
worsened in 1998 following the bombings of US embassies in Tanzania 
and Kenya. The Taliban had, since 1996, provided sanctuary for Osama 
Bin Ladin and his Al Qaida terrorist training camps.27  The terror attacks on 
the US on September 11th, 2001 led to the US bombing campaign and 
support for the Northern Alliance. The Northern Alliance consisted of 
former mujahedeen groups who had opposed the Taliban28 and they 
retook Kabul in November 2001.29 
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The IHNGOs 1979 to 1996 
IHNGOs during the Soviet invasion 
Cold War politics meant that western based IHNGOs, as in other theatres 
of the Cold War, tended to provide support to groups opposing the Soviets 
and their proxies. During the war, IHNGOs mostly operated in the Afghan 
refugee camps in Pakistan where large numbers of refugees had fled.30 
Some NGOs did carry out „cross-border‟ operations, principally in 
mujahedeen controlled areas inside Afghanistan, although these tended to 
be smaller NGOs that had close ties to the resistance movements.31 US 
foreign direct aid to the Afghan mujahedeen was channelled through the 
Pakistani ISI. The ISI had a National Logistics Cell (NLC) which delivered 
both arms to the mujahedeen and “carried food and relief supplies for 
Afghan refugees in Pakistan procured by international humanitarian aid 
agencies such as UNHCR and WFP.”32 It has been argued that the period 
of the Soviet invasion saw a lack of impartiality and neutrality from 
IHNGOs and left a “legacy of collusion between assistance and political 
agendas.”33 
 
The militarisation of the Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan served the 
purposes of the US and its Pakistani allies since the camps provided safe 
havens, recruits, food, medical supplies and a place to conceal weapons 
for the mujahedeen.34 The Pakistani authorities also required that the 
refugees join one of the seven resistance parties that Pakistan backed in 
order to obtain assistance.35  
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Only the ICRC and some smaller medical NGOs operated inside Soviet 
and Afghan government controlled areas of Afghanistan during the 
occupation.36 Most major IHNGOs operated in the refugee camps with at 
least some knowledge that the camps had a dual function, since they also 
served as a base for mujahedeen operations, training and supply.37 CARE 
officially suspended operations inside Afghanistan from 1980 to 1989, the 
period of Soviet occupation.38  Within Pakistan, CARE and Save the 
Children Fund provided food, shelter, health care and assistance with the 
maintenance of the refugee camps.39 The US administration actively 
funded NGOs, including CARE, Catholic Relief Services (CRS), Church 
World Services (CWS) and the International Rescue Committee (IRC) that 
provided aid to these camps.40  
 
MSF was the first major IHNGO to carry out cross-border work inside 
Afghanistan in 1980 and it took a specific political position opposing the 
Soviet invasion.41  Rony Brauman who was chairman of MSF-France from 
1982 to 1994 stated that MSF made a clear decision to side with the 
resistance, as did most major IHNGOs, and to denounce Soviet and 
Afghan government atrocities.42 Oxfam also carried out cross-border 
activities in the later 1980s but then suspended the aid due to the conflict 
between the conservative repression of women by the mujahedeen and 
Oxfam‟s support for women‟s rights, concentrating instead on aid within 
the camps in Pakistan.43 This is a situation Oxfam would confront again 
during the Taliban era in Afghanistan. Fiona Terry suggests that the clear 
taking of sides by NGOs in this era was because they believed “there was 
a just cause against an identifiable „oppressor.‟”44   
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It should be noted that information about specific activities of IHNGOs 
during the Soviet invasion period has been hard to come by. As Antonio 
Donini points out, the lack of documented research of this era indicates 
the lack of interest with which the politicisation of aid in the Afghan refugee 
camps in Pakistan during the cold war has been treated.45 Smilie and 
Minear also note this “blatant politicization of aid went largely unremarked 
upon.”46 The presence of IHNGOs in the camps and operating with the 
resistance inside Afghanistan also provided legitimacy for the mujahedeen 
cause,47 which, considering events since the end of the Cold War, may 
help to explain why IHNGOs do not wish to examine their actions at the 
time too closely.  
 
IHNGOs during the Afghan Civil War, 1992-1996 
The Geneva Accords of 1988 which led to Soviet withdrawal from 
Afghanistan in 1989 meant there was an opportunity for IHNGOs to move 
towards reconstruction activities inside Afghanistan and away from the 
focus on the refugee camps in Pakistan.48 Unfortunately, from 1988-1992, 
the mujahedeen factions also continued to attempt to exploit the aid 
agencies for their ongoing military and political ends and there was a 
continuing reluctance from the US and US backed NGOs to administer aid 
to government controlled areas.49 With the fall of Kabul to the mujahedeen 
and the ensuing civil war among the victorious mujahedeen factions from 
1992 to 1996 there was little room for humanitarian action. The civil war 
with its shifting alliances among mujahedeen groups, frequent attacks on 
civilian areas and widespread human rights abuses led to the 
comprehension among aid agencies of the pitfalls of the previous 
politically motivated aid that had been provided to the mujahedeen 
fighters. As a result there was a move towards more professionalism with 
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IHNGO staff arriving in Afghanistan with experience from other 
emergencies and conflict zones.50 However, the warlord era heralded 
almost complete societal breakdown and greatly impeded the provision of 
aid.51 
 
The UN and the Strategic Framework for Afghanistan 1996-2001 
A significant development during the period of Taliban rule was the United 
Nations Strategic Framework for Afghanistan (SFA). This was a UN 
centred initiative to present a united front regarding political, diplomatic 
and humanitarian actors in dealing with the Taliban. It was intended to 
“promote coherence between the assistance and political wings of the UN 
and its partner organisations” in an attempt to bring peace to 
Afghanistan.52 The „partner organisations‟ included the major IHNGOs. 
The SFA was to a large extent the result of the UN and IHNGOs trying to 
learn from their experiences during the humanitarian interventions of the 
early to mid 1990s, especially the situation in the camps in Goma in Zaire 
(later DRC) in 1994-96, following the Rwandan genocide.53 Specifically 
there was a concern about aid potentially fuelling conflicts and even 
„feeding the killers‟ as had occurred in Zaire/DRC. Nicholas Stockton does 
not fail to point out the irony of this in light of the role of aid in sustaining 
the mujahedeen-controlled camps in the 1980s.54  
 
The lack of political interest from major powers and the UN towards 
Afghanistan in the 1990s, following the end of the Cold War, aided the 
humanitarian agencies in being able to drive the SFA agenda, developing 
a consensus about the provision of aid and how to approach the Taliban 
regime.55 The policy of dealing with the Taliban and their appalling record 
on human rights, especially the rights of women, was referred to as 
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„principled engagement.‟56  The role of local, grassroots development from 
below as opposed to imposing development from above and the utility of 
aid in negotiating with the Taliban were features of the SFA making it “a 
mechanism for aid to play a security role.”57  
 
This conception of aid in a security role harks back to Boutros Ghali‟s 
„Agenda for Peace‟ and the belief that aid and development could 
ameliorate the worst aspects of the insecurity caused by poverty, 
population growth, famine and oppression that contribute to conflicts.58 Aid 
and development were starting to be viewed as mechanisms that could 
increase security, both for those in the immediate zones of instability, and 
potentially, those further away in developed societies. It should also be 
noted, however, that the SFA was an attempt to avoid the politicisation 
inherent in bilateral aid with its attached conditions from donor 
governments by developing a central and transparent system.59 
Consequently the SFA attempted to join the political and humanitarian aid 
efforts of the UN mission to allow for impartiality in its political approach.60 
It was an „integrated mission‟ in that it was a “deliberate attempt to reduce 
disconnects between the peace-making, humanitarian and human rights 
functions of the United Nations.”61 The SFA was the precursor to the 
current United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA) which 
has been active since early 2002.62  
 
While recognised after the end of Taliban rule as an “imaginative and 
valuable attempt to deal with a serious problem”63 and recognised as a 
potential strategy for the international community in future complex 
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humanitarian emergencies,64 there were also shortcomings with the SFA. 
A major criticism of the SFA was that it demonstrated that when attempting 
to engage with the Taliban, the international community as represented by 
the UN was unable to agree on unified policies or tactics.65 This was 
especially apparent in the issues surrounding the Taliban edicts restricting 
the movement of female aid workers and the exploitation of the World 
Food Programme (WFP) policy on giving food to widows.66  In these 
situations, individual IHNGOs sometimes pursued their own negotiations 
and operations in an attempt to still be effective when hamstrung by 
problems between the UN SFA and the Taliban.67 The SFA brought into 
focus the dilemma that attempting to uphold human rights could impede 
the strictly humanitarian concern of providing aid regardless of attached 
preconditions such as adherence to international human rights norms and 
gender equality.68 Other criticisms of the SFA approach are that it did not 
prevent ongoing conflict during the Taliban rule (with the Northern Alliance 
who would retake power in late 2001), improve the conditions of women or 
improve access to marginalised populations in need within Afghanistan.69 
The SFA also viewed Afghanistan under Taliban rule as a failed state 
which reinforced the pursuit of policies that avoided engagement with what 
government did in fact exist in favour of local grass roots development  
which effectively placed the UN and aid agencies as a de facto political 
opposition.70 
 
IHNGOs during the SFA 1996-2001 
According to a UN observer visiting Kabul in 1999, “NGOs had become a 
de facto shadow government running many of the social services that the 
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Taliban and their predecessors were unable or unwilling to provide.”71 
Oxfam had moved its centre of operations to Kabul within Afghanistan in 
199672 and was represented in the 1997 inter-agency mission to 
Afghanistan that led to the establishment of the SFA in 1998.73 Save the 
Children and UNICEF initially suspended operations in Taliban controlled 
areas in response to the Taliban edicts against education of girls and 
women.74 In relation to the SFA, MSF and some other NGOs were 
“sceptical of the UN‟s coordination efforts because the UN was seen to 
have a political agenda” in its state building efforts,75 although it continued 
to operate in Afghanistan. CARE worked within the SF and provided clean 
water to 400,000 people in Kabul in 1999.76 Oxfam suspended operations 
on their work on the Loghar water treatment plant in Kabul in protest at 
Taliban restrictions on women. The situation remained deadlocked 
revealing the tensions between Oxfam‟s official position on gender rights 
and its broad humanitarian objective of relieving suffering which was also 
reflected in divisions within the agency between supporters for and against 
the suspension of operations.77 The ICRC adhered to its stated impartiality 
and neutrality and was able to maintain relations with the authorities 
during Taliban rule.78 Both the ICRC and CARE also recognised and dealt 
with the corruption and shortcomings within their own feeding 
programmes, much sooner than was the case with the WFP.79  
 
Conclusion 
Afghanistan is a large area of mountain and desert terrain with a harsh 
climate. It has a strong conservative Islamic culture, but with some 
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variation such as between the Shia Islam of the Hazara in the central 
highlands and the Sunni Islam of the Pashtun majority of the south and 
east. The country has never had a strong central government and 
attempts at reform have usually precipitated armed resistance, such as 
against King Amanullah in the 1920s and against the communist Khalq in 
the 1970s and 1980s. The ethnic divisions have resulted in armed conflict 
in more recent times, for example, when their respective militias fought 
each other after Soviet withdrawal. The geography, climate, ethnic and 
tribal divisions have proved to be almost insurmountable problems for 
invading and occupying forces throughout history, especially as opposition 
to invading forces has been the one unifying force. 
 
The IHNGOs mostly operated as part of the anti-Soviet struggle, in 
support of the mujahedeen and the refugee camps in Pakistan, in the 
1980s. Later, during the period of Taliban rule and the SFA, they were 
able to exert some influence over UN and donor government policies and 
operate with a degree of operational freedom and security that they would 
not have after the 2001 intervention. Donor governments often relied on 
them for information about what projects to fund and the Taliban 
government, despite its periodic edicts, was less bureaucratic than today‟s 
Afghan government with its problems of corruption and competition for 
resources and influence.80 Most importantly for the IHNGOs, they were not 
perceived by the Taliban and other armed groups as having taken sides in 
an armed conflict.
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Chapter Six: The IHNGOs of interest to this study 
Introduction 
A brief background to the five major IHNGOs of interest to this study – the 
ICRC, IRC, Oxfam, CARE and MSF – is required, principally to understand 
their activities, involvement and policy positions regarding the intervention 
and state-building project in Afghanistan since 2001.The origins, principal 
activities, ideology and sources of funding for these five IHNGOs will be 
examined. The tensions of neutrality versus taking an active position 
regarding political and military matters, government influence and funding 
of the IHNGOs and the difficulty of upholding international humanitarian 
and human rights law without compromising activities and access to those 
in need are evident in the histories and actions of these agencies.  
 
The organisations selected for this study share some common features 
such as national member organisations in donor states as well as the state 
of their origin, a stated commitment to neutrality and impartiality and 
previous involvement in humanitarian interventions during the 1990s. They 
have all released policy statements, briefing papers or reports in the media 
and through their own publications or websites regarding the current 
intervention in Afghanistan.  
A typology of IHNGOs  
The divide between these IHNGOs centres on short-term, apolitical 
humanitarian relief versus longer-term development that incorporates an 
ideological or political dimension.  Abby Stoddard, in her typology for 
IHNGOs, divides them into „Dunantist,‟ „Wilsonian,‟ and „religious.‟1 The 
„Dunantist‟ category is named after Henri Dunant who witnessed brutal 
19th century warfare at the Battle of Solferino and wrote about it thereby 
inspiring the establishment of the Red Cross movement.2 The „Wilsonian‟ 
group of NGOs as outlined in Stoddard‟s typology are named after 
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Woodrow Wilson, the US president during the First World War and the 
driving force behind the formation of the League of Nations,  and they tend 
to accept, more than the „Dunantist‟ NGOS like the ICRC or MSF, the 
“compatibility between humanitarian aims and US foreign policy.”3 
 
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 
The oldest organisation dedicated to the alleviation of suffering in war is 
the International Committee of the Red Cross based in Geneva, 
Switzerland. Strictly speaking the ICRC is neither a non-governmental or 
inter-governmental organisation. What sets it apart from other IHNGOs is 
that it is the custodian of the legal framework of international humanitarian 
law and it has an international legal mandate to supervise conditions of 
detention in war.4 The International Red Cross movement consists of three 
pillars which are the International Federation of Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Societies, the ICRC and the national Red Cross and Red 
Crescent societies. In conflict environments the ICRC conducts the 
activities of the Federation and national movements.5 Nonetheless, many 
of the ICRC‟s core activities are very similar to other IHNGOs, especially 
MSF, who split from the ICRC as a separate organisation in the early 
1970s.  
 
The ICRC efforts in the First World War were on a smaller scale compared 
to its later operations6 and it has since been accused of allowing itself and 
its imagery to be used for propaganda purposes by the belligerents in that 
war.7 Similarly, the ICRC has been criticised for not speaking out against 
the holocaust despite knowing about the existence of the death camps 
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during the Second World War.8 A similar criticism was levelled at the ICRC 
during the war in Bosnia for their knowledge of and silence about Serb run 
concentration camps for Bosnian Muslim prisoners. One advantage the 
ICRC has in conflict situations is its clear mandate in international law for 
dealing with these situations, however it still needs to negotiate with 
belligerent parties for access to those in need.9 
 
The core activities of the ICRC include the protection of civilians and 
prisoners of war, provision of emergency medical and health care 
assistance and the promotion of international humanitarian law.10 It is the 
core principles of neutrality, impartiality and independence11 adhered to by 
the ICRC that have led to the criticisms of it remaining silent about issues 
like concentration camps. However, maintaining a neutral, impartial and 
independent position has also allowed the ICRC access to prisoners and 
populations in need when other agencies‟ neutrality, impartiality and 
independence has been compromised by their speaking out on, or being 
too closely involved with, the actions of governments involved in conflicts. 
The ICRC holds its independence as especially important12 when 
compared to other humanitarian NGOs that may be compromised by their 
political stance on human rights, work as implementing partners for host 
governments or the UN, or by the potential influence of donor government 
funding.  
 
The ICRC receives funding from “states party to the Geneva Conventions 
(governments); national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies; 
supranational organizations (such as the European Commission); and 
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public and private sources.”13  ICRC activities in Afghanistan were ranked 
as the third largest, at 73.1 million CHF (Swiss Francs), in terms of budget 
allocation in the ICRC 2009 budget.14 
 
Medicins Sans Frontieres (MSF) (Doctors Without Borders) 
MSF was formed in 1971 (making it the most recent IHNGO in this study) 
as a result of disagreements within the ICRC during the Biafran war in 
Nigeria over the ICRC insistence on providing aid to both sides in the 
conflict.15 The principle difference was the insistence by MSF founder 
Bernard Kouchner that MSF would speak out and take an active position 
in regard to humanitarian crises and conflicts.16 MSF adhered to the 
slogan “soignez et temoignez (care for and testify).”17 This was at odds 
with the ICRC‟s silence as part of its policy of neutrality and impartiality on 
political issues.  Compared to the broad areas of humanitarian aid and 
protection outlined for the ICRC above, MSF has a tighter focus on the 
emergency medical assistance to civilians18  and primary health care.19  
 
MSF has been through some major internal ideological changes. 
Kouchner later parted company with MSF and formed another NGO, 
Medicins du Monde (MDM), due to differences within MSF over his wish 
that MSF should work with states and actively promote humanitarian 
interventions.20 References to him are absent from current information 
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about the organisation on the MSF website. However, MSF still reserves 
the right to publicly confront those who commit human rights abuses by 
confronting the responsible actors themselves and “by putting pressure on 
them through mobilisation of the international community and by issuing 
information publicly.”21   
 
MSF claims its position of neutrality and no government influence on its 
activities and policies through obtaining the majority of its funding from 
non-government sources.22 According to MSF, its income in 2008 came 
from both private donations and public institutions which include 
governments and intergovernmental institutions such as the EU and UN. 
However, public institutional income made up only about 10% of total 
income, while approximately 90% came from private donors and 
foundations.23 
 
The International Rescue Committee (IRC) 
The IRC was formed in 1933. Its early history, especially the period of the 
Cold War, reveals political motivations that were often congruent with US 
government policy especially in the assistance of refugees from 
communist regimes that could aid US government intelligence about life 
behind the iron curtain and provide broadcasters for radio stations 
transmitting to communist countries.24 The IRC started as a US based arm 
of the European NGO, the International Relief Association.25 Its early 
focus was to rescue those in danger from the Nazis in Germany and later 
parts of Europe occupied by them.26 During the Cold War the IRC was 
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concerned with assisting refugees from Soviet and Eastern Bloc 
countries,27 which reflected the larger ideological concerns of the US 
government of that period.28 In terms of helping refugees, the IRC was 
especially concerned during the Cold War era with assisting refugees who 
were intellectual, cultural and political leaders, students and 
professionals.29  
 
Today the IRC provides health care, clean water, shelter and education to 
displaced people in emergency and conflict environments. This includes 
programmes specifically aimed at reducing harm to women and children 
and advancing post-conflict development.30 In 2004 the IRC was the lead 
agency coordinating NGOs in an international task force investigating the 
sexual exploitation and abuse of vulnerable women and children by UN 
and NGO workers.31 The IRC work in the area of post-conflict and 
reconstruction development includes social, economic and governance 
programmes. 32 The IRC advocates the use of community based 
approaches to development and has been involved with the Government 
of Afghanistan‟s National Solidarity Programme (NSP) in attempting to 
promote community driven development in the difficult security situation in 
the south-east of Afghanistan.33 
 
The IRC receives significant grant and contract revenues from the US 
government, the EU and the UN. In 2008, grant and contract revenues for 
the IRC came to $US 204.5 million out of a total revenue of $US 260.7 
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million, that is 78.5 % of the total revenue.34 Approximately half of the 
grant and contract revenue funding ($US 96.6 million) came from US 
government agencies including the US Bureau of Population, Refugees 
and Migration and USAID. The EU also provided just over a quarter ($US 
58.2 million) and the UN another $US 28.1 million. The IRC is therefore 
dependent on the funding of US, EU and UN and this is acknowledged in 
its financial statement.35 
Oxfam 
Oxfam International consists of a confederation of 13 national Oxfam 
organisations.36 Oxfam was started in Britain as the „Oxford Committee for 
Famine Relief‟ in 1942. This was during the Second World War and was in 
response to the plight of starving people in German occupied Greece 
which was under an allied naval blockade at the time.37 Unlike the ICRC, 
Oxfam reserved the right to speak out on humanitarian matters, as it still 
does, although the position of the organisation on particular issues is liable 
to internal division and debate as revealed by Tony Vaux.38 An important 
experience in the development of Oxfam, as was the case for MSF, was 
Oxfam‟s vocal support for the Biafran side in the Nigerian civil war and the 
realisation that in hindsight many of the aid agencies including Oxfam had 
been exploited by the Biafran leadership in aiding and providing legitimacy 
to one side which had compromised the stated neutrality and impartiality 
of the IHNGOs in the conflict.39 Oxfam is a multi mandate agency that 
often provides a mix of both longer term development aid and emergency 
assistance. In Afghanistan, a situation Oxfam classifies as an emergency, 
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it identifies the provision of clean water, sanitation, rebuilding of roads and 
bridges, education and advocacy (especially for women) as the principal 
tasks it undertakes.40 
 
Examination of the financial statements of the two largest Oxfam affiliate 
members, Oxfam GB and Oxfam America, reveal a difference in their size 
and sources of funding. Oxfam GB received 26.8 % of its funding from the 
UK government including the DFID and public authorities in 2007-2008.41 
Oxfam America claims to refuse US government funding42 and obtained 
58.8% of its funding from individual donations in 2007-2008.43 Oxfam GB 
is the much larger organisation in terms of finances with an income of 
approximately 300 million UK pounds ($US 500 million) in 2007-200844 
compared with Oxfam America‟s income of approximately $US 141.5 
million (85 million UK pounds) in 2007-2008.45 The combined expenditure 
of Oxfam International in 2007-2008 was $US 828 million46 which 
demonstrates the much more significant contribution of Oxfam GB, 
although it receives over a quarter of its funding from the UK government. 
Oxfam clearly takes a political stance on many issues surrounding 
humanitarian aid and economic development including economic justice, 
gender discrimination, human rights, climate change and unfair trade 
practices.47  
Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE) 
Originally known as the „Cooperative for American Remittances to 
Europe,‟ CARE is a US based IHNGO that has been active since the end 
of the Second World War. In its modern incarnation CARE specialises in 
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the delivery of food aid and logistics.48 CARE claims to have a focus on 
the welfare of women and children and also on the “underlying causes of 
poverty so that people can become self sufficient.”49 Other development 
activities CARE undertakes include agriculture, economic development 
and education.  
 
CARE came into existence to deliver food to Europe during the US foreign 
policy initiative of the Marshall plan which was a US foreign policy reaction 
to Soviet encroachment into Europe.50 Today the CARE international 
website does not mention the overt congruence between itself and US 
foreign policy that existed in earlier times, for example, during the Cold 
War in Europe or later the „hot‟ proxy war between the Soviet and US 
backed forces in Afghanistan in the 1980s.51 
 
In more recent times, CARE has taken policy positions that are less 
coherent with US policy than has been the case in the past. Notably, in 
2007, CARE rejected the offer of $45 million in federal US government 
funding due to concerns about the provision of US food aid which CARE 
and other NGOs believed was harming the economy and livelihoods of 
local farmers in developing countries.52 According to CARE‟s 2008 
financial statements, US government funding accounted for about a third 
of its income, of which the majority was in cash, with a smaller contribution 
through agricultural commodities.53 
 
Conclusion 
The five IHNGOs examined here can be divided into two groups as 
outlined by Stoddard. The ICRC and MSF are Dunantist organisations with 
                                            
48
 Stoddard, p.26. 
49
 CARE, „What We Do,‟ <http://www.care.org/careswork/whatwedo/index.asp> 
[Accessed August 4, 2009], (para.1) 
50
 Stoddard, p.27. 
51
 Baitenmenn, p.69. 
52
 Dugger, Celia, „CARE Turns Down Federal Funds for Food Aid,‟ New York Times, 16 
August, 2007 ; Harrell, Eben, „CARE Turns Down U.S Food Aid,‟ Time, 15 August 2007 
53
 CARE USA, „Consolidated Financial Statements for the year ended June 30, 2008‟ 
<http://www.care.org/newsroom/publications/annualreports/2008/CARE_AFS_2008.pdf> 
[Accessed November 20, 2009], p.27. 
72 
 
an emphasis on short term humanitarian assistance. The ICRC remains 
strictly neutral and will not speak out on political issues, whereas MSF will 
do so. The Wilsonian IHNGOs, CARE, IRC and Oxfam are also known as 
„multi- mandate‟ agencies because they carry out both humanitarian relief 
and longer term development work, dealing with the underlying causes of 
poverty and addressing human, civil and political rights issues.54 This 
difference is significant when these agencies are involved with 
international interventions and a state-building process where there is 
ongoing conflict between an internationally supported government and an 
armed opposition, as in Afghanistan. 
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Chapter Seven: Aid and Development as Counter-
Insurgency – Provincial Reconstruction Teams 
(PRTs) 
Counter-insurgency and humanitarian aid and development 
Provincial Reconstruction teams (PRTs) have evolved as a result of 
military involvement in humanitarian aid/development and from counter-
insurgency strategy. The counter-insurgency tactic of using aid, 
development assistance and reconstruction work to gain support from a 
population in a conflict zone away from supporting or being intimidated by 
insurgent groups can be traced back to the British tactics to „win hearts 
and minds,‟ the phrase coined by Field Marshall Sir Gerald Templer, 
during the Malayan insurgency in the 1950s.1 The US military attempted to 
employ similar tactics during the Vietnam War in the 1960s using Civil 
Operations and Revolutionary Development teams (CORDs).2  
 
The military - humanitarian interventions since 1990 have occurred in a 
context of there being no broader Cold War ideological divide, but with the 
IHNGOs increasingly aware of military involvement with activities that they 
have previously regarded as their own. Short-term humanitarian relief 
such as the provision of emergency food aid and medical care as well as 
longer-term development projects such as the rebuilding of schools and 
medical clinics are activities IHNGOs claim should be based on the 
principles of impartiality, neutrality and independence.3 However, these 
actions have now also become a feature of military activity in the post-
conflict state building and reconstruction phase of operations by 
intervening forces, and in this context they are employed to further political 
objectives rather than meet humanitarian needs. The consequences for 
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those who do not qualify as deserving of military provided aid are clear in 
the US Army Counterinsurgency manual FM 3-24: “There is no such thing 
as impartial humanitarian assistance or CMO (Civil-Military Operations) in 
COIN (Counterinsurgency). Whenever someone is helped, someone else 
is hurt, not least the insurgents.”4 
 
The context of post-Taliban Afghanistan 
Following the capture of Kabul in November 2001 by the forces of the 
Northern Alliance, who were allied with the US led coalition involved in 
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) to defeat the Taliban and Al Qaida, 
there was a period of more than two years during which intervening 
international forces had little influence beyond Kabul, while US and 
coalition forces principally concentrated on operations against Al Qaida 
and remnants of the Taliban in the south-east close to the border with 
Pakistan.5  In December 2001 the Bonn Agreement set out a plan for 
Afghanistan‟s transition to democracy, but with little control over realities 
on the ground in Afghanistan. Compromises were made early on that co-
opted former warlords and militia leaders into the new government and its 
institutions which would lead to problems of corruption and legitimacy for 
the Afghan government.6 The United Nations established the United 
Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)7 in March 2002 and 
mandated an international security assistance force (ISAF) which was 
initially only present in Kabul in 2002 and did not move to expand into the 
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north until 2004, the west in 2005 and finally the south and east in 2006.8 
The PRTs were a part of the expansion of ISAF and Afghan government 
control militarily into the provinces that had languished under control of 
various warlords and militias since the fall of the Taliban. The Taliban 
themselves have managed a resurgence in the south and east since 2004 
and the fighting that has ensued between them and ISAF, Afghan National 
Army (ANA) and Coalition troops continues into the present day and has 
worsened to the extent of eclipsing Iraq as the major foreign policy 
concern for the current US administration.9 
 
Rationale and composition 
Following the initial defeat of the Taliban, US forces established Coalition 
Humanitarian Liaison Cells in early 2002 which consisted of small groups 
of Civil Affairs (CA) officers who assessed the need for humanitarian 
assistance in their area, carried out small-scale reconstruction activities 
and liaised with UNAMA and NGOs.10 During 2002, some US CA officers 
and Special Forces soldiers operated in civilian clothes, in unmarked 
vehicles and carried out some relief and reconstruction activities with the 
military objective of gathering intelligence on Al Qaida and the Taliban.11 
The first PRTs were established in late 2002 and early 2003 in the 
provinces of Gardez, Bamian (NZ PRT), Kondoz, Mazar-e-Sharif, 
Khandahar and Herat.12 The initial US PRTs consisted of about 80 
soldiers, some of whom were to provide security for the PRT staff („force 
protection‟), while others specialised in areas such as health or 
construction.  There were also three US government and civilian agency 
representatives.13 The focus of the US PRT model was governance, force 
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protection and „quick impact development projects‟ (QIPs).14 The 
governance aspect of PRTs was in the focus on capacity building of 
provincial government administrations and linking them to the central 
Afghan government.15 The force protection element of the PRTs was in 
regard to their own security as they were not mandated to provide security 
to either the Afghan civilian population or staff of UNAMA and NGOs.16 
QIPs included such tasks as the rebuilding of schools and medical clinics 
with the political/ military objective of winning over the local population and 
gathering intelligence about insurgents. The QIPs therefore had a clear 
counter-insurgency motive in their „hearts and minds‟ strategy.17  
 
The expansion of national PRTs within ISAF 
From 2003 onwards NATO took leadership of the UN mandated ISAF and 
gradually took over or set up PRTs across Afghanistan.18 These PRTs are 
under the leadership of various nations within NATO. In 2009, some 26 
PRTs were operating in four regional command groups. PRT contributing 
nations are the US, UK, Germany, Sweden, Hungary, Norway, Italy, 
Spain, Lithuania, Canada, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Turkey and the 
Czech Republic.19  It should be noted that Sweden and New Zealand are 
not actually members of NATO but come under NATO command through 
being part of ISAF. Of the 26 PRTs, 12 are under US control, two are 
under German control and all the other nations are represented by one 
PRT.20  
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Due to the various national government concerns and agendas of the PRT 
home countries there is a lot of variety in terms of leadership, rules 
surrounding movement and engagement, sizes and types of activity they 
perform. Three main models of PRT have emerged. The US model has 
about 80 members including a few civilian representatives, there is a focus 
on QIPs and it is able to operate in hostile areas. The UK model is civilian-
led, with about 100 members including 30 civilians, there is a focus on 
governance capacity building and it is able to operate in hostile areas. 
Lastly, there is a German model with both military and civilian leadership, 
about 400 members including about 20 civilians, a long-term development 
focus and these are operational in less hostile regions.21 
 
Assessment of the performance of PRTs in Afghanistan 
The PRTs in Afghanistan have had mixed results in terms of their 
effectiveness. A major problem for those wishing to assess their 
performance is the difficulty inherent in the security situation in 
Afghanistan. Some assessments of PRTs, such as that by Andrea Lopez, 
make the claim that they are in fact effective in enhancing the reach and 
legitimacy of the Afghan central government but that they have been 
hindered by a lack of funding, manpower and resources.22 Lopez claims 
“the PRTs are placing US forces directly among the people and having the 
military, in conjunction with international governmental organisations 
(IGOs), NGOs, and local workers and contractors,” and that this is building 
“political and social ties to the central government.”23 Michael McNerney 
claims they are a flexible and useful instrument for stabilisation and 
reconstruction operations, but in the case of Afghanistan there needs to be 
more PRTs deployed for them to be truly effective.24  
 
                                            
21
 Nima Abbaszadeh and others, Provincial Reconstruction Teams: Lessons and 
Recommendations (Princeton, NJ: Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International 
Affairs, 2008), p.5. 
22
 Andrea Lopez, „Engaging or Withdrawing, Winning or Losing? The Contradictions of 
Counterinsurgency Policy in Afghanistan and Iraq,’ Third World Quarterly, 28 (2007), 245-
260 (p.258). 
23
 Lopez, p.155. 
24
 Michael McNerney, „Stabilisation and Reconstruction in Afghanistan: Are PRTs a 
Model or a Muddle?‟ Parameters, 35 (Winter 2005/2006), 32-46,(p.44). 
78 
 
A study by Sebastian Rietjens of civil-military cooperation within the 
Netherlands‟ PRT in Baghlan province revealed some shortcomings. He 
found a lack of guidelines for military and civilian cooperation in the PRTs, 
a lack of awareness of other actors (including IHNGOs) operating in the 
same area, reconstruction activities that were supply rather than demand  
based and a lack of specific training of military staff in this type of work.25 
Touko Piiparinen identified organisational and national interest issues 
within the Norwegian PRT in Meyanmeh.26  The organisational aspect 
related to the different „mind sets‟ apparent in the civilian and military view 
of the success or otherwise of the Disarmament of Illegal Armed Groups 
(DIAG).27 The national interests of PRT contributing countries were 
identified in the differing focus and approaches they took to their 
reconstruction work.28 Barbara Stapleton also identified the lack of unity in 
the different approaches of national PRTs29 and suggested that the PRTs 
were only peripheral to the bigger picture in Afghanistan, especially the 
failure of the state building process.30 This issue of how the PRTs fit into 
the overall political and military context of the intervention in Afghanistan 
needs to be explored further, since this has implications for the assertion 
that aid and development are merging with security to manage regions of 
the world that are experiencing complex humanitarian emergencies. 
 
PRTs in the wider political and military context of the post-2001 
intervention in Afghanistan 
Considering that NATO‟s role in Afghanistan via ISAF and the PRTs is to 
“assist the Afghan Government in exercising and extending its authority 
and influence across the country,”31 it is of concern that the Afghan 
government is “mired in a deepening legitimacy crisis, the causes of which 
lay well beyond the limited capacity and resources of the PRTs 
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meaningfully to address.”32 Barbara Stapleton, the political advisor to the 
Office of the EU Special Representative in Afghanistan, made the point 
about the legitimacy crisis of the Afghan government in 2007. The recent 
Presidential elections and the highly contested re-election of President 
Harmid Karzai amid allegations of electoral fraud have brought this issue 
into even sharper focus.33  
 
Before exploring the reactions of IHNGOS to the development of the PRT 
strategy it is worth examining the role of PRTs within the wider 
international nation-building project in post-Taliban Afghanistan. Following 
the initial overthrow of the Taliban by the Northern Alliance, essentially a 
grouping of resurgent mujahedeen forces that had previously been 
engaged in the war against the Soviets and had fought each other during 
the Afghan Civil war from 1992-1996,34 there was only a light ISAF 
presence of 4,800 troops located in Kabul during 2002 and without 
instructions to expand control into other parts of the country despite 
requests to do so from the transitional Afghan government and the 
international aid community.35 Some estimated 200,000 armed men under 
various warlords controlled the interior36 while the US led OEF pursued Al 
Qaida and Taliban in the south-east near Pakistan.37 The US did not want 
to commit extra men and resources, specifically its airpower, which would 
be required to back up the ISAF expansion, and initially blocked plans for 
ISAF expansion.38 The need for US air power for transport and air cover 
plus concerns about different intervening forces operating in the same 
areas and the dangers of friendly fire were suggested as reasons for this 
US reluctance to initially support ISAF at the time.39 Another likely reason 
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for the conservative deployment by the US to Afghanistan was the looming 
war in Iraq that would start in March of 2003.40 Equally, delays in ISAF 
deployment and the emphasis on US operations in pursuit of Al Qaida and 
the Taliban may have suited the governments of other troop contributing 
countries wishing to avoid potential casualties that would not be popular 
with their own constituencies.41 
 
PRTs, in their first years especially, were an attempt to spread the 
influence of ISAF in support of the new Afghan central government without 
substantial international military commitment, aside from US and UK 
forces engaged in direct combat with the Taliban and Al Qaida, using a 
“light footprint” as the UN Special Representative Lakhdar Brahimi called it 
in 2002.42 
 
This can be seen as part of a wider international state-building process 
that has evolved in response to the humanitarian crises and interventions 
of the 1990s that Nicholas Stockton has referred to as “peace- building 
lite.”43 This approach to state-building places an emphasis on building 
local capacity rather than reliance on massive international aid distribution 
because of the potential for it to be misused and/or fuel conflicts such as 
was the concern in Goma in Zaire in 1994-1996, and the use of reduced, 
but targeted, “smart aid.”44 In the post-Taliban era Afghanistan, the PRTs 
reflect a similar minimalism to what has evolved in the humanitarian aid 
sector, they have a wide array of tasks including security, reconstruction 
and improving governance yet are small units with limited manpower and 
resources.  
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IHNGO criticism of PRTs 
Security is an issue for IHNGOs both in terms of their own security being 
compromised by the blurring of the lines between themselves and military 
actors and the perceived failure of PRTs to provide a security environment 
within which the IHNGOs can operate with some degree of safety. The 
PRTs‟ contribution to the security situation in Afghanistan has been 
questioned by critics from the IHNGO sector who claim the security 
situation for civilians and aid workers has deteriorated considerably since 
2002.45  Paul O‟Brien and Paul Barker from CARE International (Advocacy 
Coordinator and Country Director respectively), pointed out in 2003 that 
security would be the fundamental issue for Afghanistan in the following 
five years and that potential threats to it existed from the Taliban, warlords 
within the new government, the lack of internal security forces and 
external interference especially from Pakistan and Iran.46 They believed 
the PRTs were a “distraction from more serious discussions about country-
wide security” since they had “neither the resources nor the mandate to 
engage seriously in either reconstruction or security.”47  
 
A frequent concern expressed by the IHNGOs is that the aid and 
reconstruction work of the PRTs has confused both the Afghan population 
and the insurgents in terms of differentiating between military and aid 
workers.48 This blurring of the lines has led to civilians and AOGs 
associating IHNGOs with the international military and Afghan government 
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either directly or suspecting them of providing intelligence to, or otherwise 
covertly operating with, these forces.49 
 
IHNGO criticisms of PRTs beyond the blurring of the roles issue have 
identified the questionable quality of the work done by the PRTs and 
especially by the contractors hired by the PRTs to implement their 
projects.50 A briefing paper prepared by NGOs including CARE, the IRC 
and Oxfam identified this issue.51 The country director of the IRC in 2009 
pointed out that there has been a “prioritisation of contractors versus 
NGOs as the US government or foreign governments have attempted to 
deliver programmes to scale, and their strategy for delivering the scale 
was through contractors. They are now seeing the scale is at the expense 
of efficiency and quality.” 52 Other criticisms are that the PRT projects do 
not create a sense of “local ownership” or “buy-in,”53 become targets for 
the insurgents,54 are an inefficient use of funds,55 and that there is an 
overall lack of consistency and coherence across the different national 
PRTs.56 
 
The quarterly reports of the Afghanistan NGO Safety Office (ANSO) make 
it very clear that attacks against aid workers have generally increased, 
especially since 2006,57 although slightly reduced in 2009 compared to 
2008, and with a shift towards a majority (70%) of the attacks being 
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carried out by Armed Opposition Groups (AOG) with political as opposed 
to criminal motives.58  Some IHNGOs have stated there is a clear link 
between the blurring of the roles of PRTs and NGOs leading to politically 
motivated attacks by insurgents against aid workers. Nathanial Raymond 
from Oxfam America argues that the security of aid workers and the 
people they are trying to help in Afghanistan is threatened by this blurring 
of the lines by PRTs, since the aid workers are perceived as part of the 
political or military agenda (as the PRTs are) of intervening powers or the 
Afghan government.59  A survey of NGO staff in Afghanistan conducted by 
CARE and ANSO in May 2005 asked NGO staff to identify factors they 
believed led to the deterioration in the security situation. The factors they 
identified and the percentages of staff that chose them were: 
 Presidential elections - 21 %   
 Poppy eradication- 12%  
 Worsening perceptions of NGOs - 11% 
 Increase in criminal activity - 7%  
 Blurring of the lines between military and humanitarian actors- 
5%.60 
It is worth noting that the study was conducted before the fighting season 
started in earnest in 2005, but for the NGO staff surveyed at that time the 
blurring of the lines was less of a concern than a number of other security 
factors. 
 
The loss of humanitarian space 
The term humanitarian space has been used in relation to actual physical 
spaces such as safe havens or humanitarian corridors,61 but in terms of 
IHNGOs operating in conflict zones it refers to the stated principles of 
humanity, impartiality and neutrality that are claimed to govern IHNGO 
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actions and that are recognized in humanitarian law and the ICRC Code of 
Conduct.62 The Sphere Project, that sets minimum standards for IHNGO 
principles and standards, includes the principles of neutrality and 
impartiality,63 although not independence as is included in the ICRC Code 
of Conduct. These principles are also important in the way IHNGOs are 
perceived by both those they provide assistance to and by belligerents in 
conflict situations.  Whereas security is an ever present operational 
concern for IHNGOs in conflict environments, it is their maintenance of 
humanitarian space that they often hold as their main shield against 
potential attack.  
 
The degree to which the stated loss of humanitarian space for IHNGOs is 
a result of the activities of military actors such as PRTs engaging in aid 
and reconstruction work causing a blurring of the lines needs to be 
compared with other potential factors that may compromise their claims to 
neutrality and therefore their security. The perception from the point of 
view of AOGs that IHNGOs broadly represent western political, social and 
cultural intervention and appear allied with and in support of the state-
building project of the international community in Afghanistan is a potential 
factor. IHNGO involvement with the current Afghan government, with its 
inherent issues of corruption and legitimacy, are other factors in the 
shrinking of humanitarian space and security for IHNGOs. In attempting to 
distance themselves from these factors IHNGOs conversely make 
themselves easy or „soft‟ targets for both politically motivated and criminal 
attacks.  
 
The fatal attack against MSF in 2004 leading to MSF withdrawing from 
operations in the country reveals more than one explanation for what has 
led to the seriously compromised security situation for IHNGOs. It was 
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blamed on a corrupt local police commander,64 an example of the 
problems caused by the politically expedient inclusion of former warlords 
and militia into the new Afghan army and police. However, the Taliban 
also claimed responsibility for the attack claiming aid workers were 
working for the US occupation65 and MSF blamed both the Afghan 
government for not investigating the potential involvement of its own 
appointees while also blaming the attack on the blurring of the lines 
between military forces and aid workers.66 Fabrice Weissman, Research 
Director for MSF, also apportioned some of the responsibility for this onto 
the aid community itself in allowing its impartiality to be compromised 
through association and work with the UNAMA and interim Afghan 
government.67  
 
Conclusion 
Military involvement in aid and reconstruction activity has a clear tactical, 
strategic and political agenda, whereas IHNGOs believe aid should be 
provided solely on the basis of need. This is an intractable issue at the 
heart of the ideological difference between the two groups. The IHNGOs in 
this study have all attempted to distance themselves from direct 
involvement with the military because of the lack of impartiality, neutrality 
and independence of military provided aid. They have criticised the most 
visible form of military provided aid and reconstruction work, the PRTs, for 
compromising NGO security through blurring the perceived roles of military 
and aid actors in the eyes of Afghan civilians and AOGs. They have also 
criticised the PRTs for the poor quality of the work of the contractors they 
employ, for creating projects that become targets for insurgents, for not 
involving communities in the project decision making, for being inefficient 
and expensive and, and ironically, for not providing better security for 
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civilians and NGOs.68 A common request from IHNGOs has been for the 
PRTs, since they are military entities, to concentrate on establishing a 
secure environment within which the NGOs can operate. This view is 
exemplified by Save the Children which stated in 2004: “civil-military 
teams should exploit their comparative advantages in the areas of security 
and, specifically, by ensuring a security environment conducive to 
reconstruction and humanitarian activities undertaken by other actors.”69  
 
Although it is clear security conditions have worsened for NGOs, the 
single issue of the blurring of the humanitarian-military distinction by PRTs 
does not fully explain the serious deterioration in the security environment 
for IHNGOs. For the international community, including both PRTs and 
IHNGOs, the assumption that they were operating in a post-conflict 
environment in support of a new and accepted government proved to be 
premature when they were confronted by a growing insurgency, a 
government struggling for legitimacy and control, faltering international 
commitment and the principal military power, the US, distracted by a new 
war in Iraq in 2003. The activities, proportion of expatriate and national 
staff, security concerns, and press and policy statements of the IHNGOs in 
Afghanistan chosen for this study need to be examined to put them into 
the wider context of the international intervention and state-building model 
that has been employed there since 2001.
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Chapter Eight: The IHNGOs in Afghanistan from 
2001 
The humanitarian situation at the end of Taliban rule 
Kabul fell to the forces of the Northern Alliance on November 13th 2001 
and by early December they had also captured the last Taliban stronghold 
of Kandahar. Prior to the events of September 11th 2001 the international 
humanitarian assistance presence in Afghanistan was very light with 
approximately 200 expatriate staff from international NGOs and 60 from 
the UN.1 In advance of the US and Northern Alliance war against the 
Taliban that started in October 2001, international staff of most UN 
agencies and NGOs had been evacuated from the country as the Taliban 
could not guarantee their safety with the onset of the war.2  At the same 
time, the UN and aid agencies were concerned about the potential 
humanitarian crisis that would be caused by the war coinciding with winter, 
and the drought and famine that had gripped Afghanistan since 2000.3 The 
dropping of food aid parcels by the US Air Force in an attempt to present a 
humanitarian side to the US war against the Taliban was heavily criticised 
by IHNGOs as being ineffective and dangerous in that the food parcels 
resembled cluster bombs and sometimes landed in mine fields.4 Oxfam, 
MSF and Save the Children criticised these food drops and also pointed 
out the issue of the blurring of lines between humanitarian and military 
action,5 a claim that would appear repeatedly in the IHNGO – military 
relationship in Afghanistan. 
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The resurgence of the international aid community 
In early 2002 a “mushrooming aid industry” arrived in Kabul.6 The 
development of the Afghan Transitional Authority mandated by the Bonn 
Agreement of December 20017 plus the growth of the international military 
(ISAF) and assistance presence in Kabul through 2002 and 2003 created 
“the Kabul bubble,”8 but with the international aid presence growing 
progressively thinner away from the Afghan capital.9 In 1999 there had 
been 46 international NGOs operating in Afghanistan, by November 2002 
this number had grown to 350,10 clear evidence of the IHNGO 
community‟s growing interest in and involvement with the early phase of 
the state building project in the Afghanistan. This aid rush occurred as UN 
agencies and NGOs arrived to implement the aid and reconstruction 
planned for Afghanistan and competed with each other for media visibility 
and/or contracts. Donor governments met in Tokyo in January 2002 and 
pledged nearly $US 2 billion in aid to Afghanistan,11 however later in the 
same year the new Afghan Transitional Government was already 
complaining of the failure of some of the pledges to materialise,12 thus 
heralding the beginning of rapid disillusionment within Afghanistan with the 
international reconstruction effort. Ultimately NGOs would become 
scapegoats for these problems and be seen as responsible in the eyes of 
the Afghan government and the Afghan people for the failure of any 
perceptible improvement in their lives in the years following the 2001 
intervention.13 
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The increase in the numbers and influence of both international and 
Afghan NGOs from 2002 to 2004 was largely the result of these agencies 
being the preferred means of delivering bilateral and UN funded 
humanitarian aid due to the lack of the new Afghan government‟s capacity 
to do this.14 In the early post-Taliban era the IHNGOs‟ methods of 
delivering aid and reconstruction assistance also often bypassed 
traditional elements of Afghan society such as shuras (village committees) 
and tribal elders as they did not embody the liberal values inherent in the 
new democratic and human rights focused vision the international 
community now held for Afghanistan.15 The influx of new aid workers, 
some of whom lacked knowledge of Afghanistan‟s conservative Islamic 
culture, led to problems with how their lifestyles were perceived by the 
local population, the quality of their work due to an emphasis on speed 
and quantity, competition among NGOs for visibility in aid projects and 
additional security concerns as the NGOs spread out into the 
countryside.16 The aid agency influx also had detrimental effects on the 
local economy. Many remaining skilled staff in the Afghan government left 
for much higher paid jobs in international NGOs and the UN17 and rents in 
Kabul boomed as UN and NGO staff paid for accommodation at much 
higher rates than could be afforded by local residents.18 The aid money 
pouring into the country was often not benefitting the majority of citizens 
while a few made large profits from the influx of aid money by working for 
the UN and NGOs or by renting out buildings at inflated prices to NGO and 
UN staff.19 
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The politicisation of the humanitarian action in Afghanistan since the 
2001 intervention  
The fundamental problem faced by IHNGOs in the post-Taliban era has 
been their position within the wider political objectives of the international 
intervention and state building process in Afghanistan and the impact this 
has had on their operations and security. Compared to the time of the 
Afghan Civil War or the period of Taliban rule, when they had considerable 
autonomy,20 they are now, although often unwillingly, politically embedded 
within the international US and NATO led intervention. They represent 
western values also championed by the intervening forces, especially in 
terms of their positions on gender issues and human rights. Their “visions 
of the good society and what it might look like in Afghanistan and Iraq 
have much in common with the Coalition‟s.”21  The IHNGOs that are 
involved with longer term development projects as well as providing 
humanitarian aid have also inadvertently positioned themselves politically 
alongside the longer term development goals of the international 
intervention and the new Afghan government in the eyes of AOGs and the 
Afghan people.22 The immediate humanitarian relief objectives of the 
ICRC and MSF have enabled them to distance themselves from alignment 
with the development objectives of the Afghan government and 
international forces, but this has proved no guarantee for them against 
attack. 
 
The operational reality for IHNGOs  
UNAMA was intended to be able to coordinate political action and 
humanitarian aid at a strategic level,23 but the operational realities on the 
ground for both UN agencies and local and international NGOs were often 
much more difficult. In 2002-2003, local and international NGOs often 
moved into areas that were accessible while missing out other places that 
were actually more in need of their assistance. This was due to both 
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security concerns and problems in communication, transport, lack of 
experienced staff and resources.24 Interestingly the early PRT 
deployments of 2002-2003 were also often to provincial capitals that 
already had some degree of security such as Kunduz, Mazar-i-Sharif and 
Bamiyan. This brought into question their effectiveness and the criticism 
from NGOs that they were competing with them and causing confusion for 
the local population about military and humanitarian actors, leading to the 
blurring the lines between the two sets of actors.25 According to an 
expatriate IHNGO staff member currently working in Afghanistan, the 
period from 2002 to 2004 was better overall for security for IHNGOs than 
in the years that have followed, especially since 2006.26  However attacks 
on aid workers started in earnest in 2003 with 12 NGO staff killed, and this 
escalated in 2004 with 24 staff killed.27 The deteriorating security situation 
prompted a coalition of NGOs to advocate for the expansion of ISAF 
forces beyond Kabul in an open letter, “Afghanistan a call for security,” to 
NATO in June 2003. CARE, IRC and Oxfam were signatories, but the 
ICRC and MSF did not join in making this call.28  
 
Expatriate and national staff 
After an initial influx of expatriate staff in the immediate aftermath of the 
2001 war, most IHNGOs have maintained and further increased Afghan 
national staff while reducing expatriate staff. For example, the IRC had fifty 
expatriate staff in 2002 and 2003, but by December 2009 this number was 
down to four, while the organisation has nearly 400 national staff.29 The 
ICRC has maintained a larger number of expatriate staff in Afghanistan. In 
2009 it had 115 expatriate staff with a correspondingly larger number of 
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about 1262 national staff.30 According to CARE, 99 percent of its 900 staff 
in Afghanistan are Afghan national staff, with only eight to ten expatriate 
staff.31 This reduction in expatriate staff, while maintaining or increasing 
national staff, not only reflects the difficult security environment for most 
NGOs in Afghanistan but is also in keeping with the NGO policies of local 
participation and involvement in development plus the advantages of 
acceptance and communication that local staff can achieve with their own 
people. International NGOs are seeking a lower profile and have taken 
down signs and flags even in Kabul, where expatriate staff are still 
present. Travel by road for expatriate staff is often too dangerous and 
national staff travel in unmarked vehicles or public transport to access 
populations in need.32 Consequently it has been the national staff of the 
international NGOs that have been the most frequent targets of violence 
against humanitarian workers in Afghanistan. All 19 fatalities due to armed 
attack against NGOs in 2009 in Afghanistan were national staff.33 
The IHNGOs in Afghanistan: 2001-2009 
The ICRC 
The ICRC evacuated all expatriate staff from Taliban controlled 
Afghanistan in September 2001 ahead of the US bombing campaign and 
war that would oust the Taliban.34  National staff of the ICRC remained 
throughout the US bombing campaign that destroyed ICRC food 
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warehouses in Kabul,35 but expatriate staff had started to return by mid 
November 2001 with the overthrow of the Taliban.36  
 
The first expatriate humanitarian aid worker to be killed in post-Taliban 
Afghanistan was an ICRC staff member in March 2003 in Uruzgan 
province in the south of the country.37  The ICRC has maintained a large 
presence in Afghanistan, and since it provides humanitarian assistance in 
areas of conflict, it is increasingly required, and the organisation has been 
active in the country since the era of the Soviet invasion.38 More recently, 
an Afghan national staff member was killed by a bomb explosion in 
Kandahar in August 2009.39 
 
Compared to the other IHNGOs examined in this study, the ICRC has 
managed to maintain the most neutral, impartial and independent position 
in the Afghan conflict. This can partly be explained by the ICRC‟s direct 
focus on humanitarian relief as opposed to the longer term development 
work engaged in by most other IHNGOs which consequently involves 
them to some extent with the Afghan government and international forces 
who are the direct opponents of the Taliban. The ICRC has made few 
statements about the concerns often expressed by other IHNGOs relating 
to military provision of aid and reconstruction work. Making criticisms of 
military strategy would be at odds with the organisation‟s need to have 
access to the wounded and to prisoners. However, in 2004 following 
attacks against ICRC staff in Afghanistan and Iraq, the ICRC operations 
director Pierre Krahenbuhl did identify PRTs and the military 
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instrumentalisation of aid as presenting risks to the ICRC in its operations 
and of the perceptions of it held by populations in regions of conflict.40  
 
The ICRC‟s position has also allowed them to be an intermediary between 
the belligerent parties especially in negotiations concerning prisoners. An 
example of this was the Taliban approach to the ICRC regarding 
negotiations for the release of South Korean hostages taken by the 
Taliban in 2007.41 Regardless of the ICRC‟s standing in international law, 
its utility for this kind of negotiation suggests another reason why it has 
some degree of acceptance from the armed opposition. The ICRC has 
consequently been able to negotiate with all belligerent parties and this 
has reached the extent that in December 2009 they were able for the first 
time to visit ANA soldiers held as prisoners by the Taliban.42 
 
The ICRC undertakes emergency medical and humanitarian relief in 
Afghanistan but has stopped any longer term development programmes in 
the country due to the potential association with the Afghan government or 
international forces that these may present in terms of compromising the 
ICRC‟s neutrality, impartiality and independence.43 
 
MSF 
MSF had 70 expatriate staff and almost 400 national staff in Afghanistan in 
2001 and it withdrew its expatriate staff ahead of the war in September of 
that year.44 Like many other aid agencies at this time, MSF was also 
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concerned about the war exacerbating the already dire conditions of 
famine and drought that existed in the country.45 During the war MSF was 
vocal in its opposition to the use of humanitarian food aid drops from the 
air by the coalition forces saying that these were inefficient and that MSF 
was concerned about the “clear risks in associating humanitarian aid with 
military operations.”46  During the US bombing campaign the Executive 
Director of MSF-USA, Nicholas Torrente, gave a speech to a joint hearing 
of the US Congressional South Asian Affairs Subcommittee and Terrorism 
Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee outlining MSF‟s 
concerns about the integration of humanitarian and military operations 
such as access to those in need and the potential for aid workers to be 
targeted.47  This is worth noting as MSF is the first IHNGO that most 
clearly expressed concerns about the blurring of the roles of military and 
humanitarian actors and their actions, well before the establishment of 
PRTs and other forms of military-humanitarian counter-insurgency 
operations in post-Taliban Afghanistan. The concern about military 
involvement in humanitarian action is one of the central pillars of IHNGO 
criticisms of PRTs and other forms of counter-insurgency that combine 
military action with aid and reconstruction. 
 
Between 2002 and 2004 MSF undertook a range of humanitarian relief 
activities in Afghanistan including feeding centres, programmes for new 
mothers, vaccination and health care programmes, mobile clinics in 
remote areas, clean water, sanitation and programmes against specific 
diseases including tuberculosis and leishmaniasis.48 Other problems that 
MSF dealt with in the 2002 to 2004 period included the pressure on 
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refugee camps and health care facilities of the repatriation of 1.5 million 
refugees from Pakistan and Iran. This pressure was further increased by 
people who were newly displaced as a result of continued fighting and the 
ongoing drought.49 
 
MSF international staff started to return to Afghanistan from mid November 
2001 and by the end of November there were more than 50 international 
MSF staff back in the country, specifically in the major cities and provincial 
centres.50  By October 2003 MSF‟s staff had increased to 107 expatriates 
and 1380 Afghan nationals.51  MSF was outspoken about the deteriorating 
security situation in 2003 and identified a number of issues it believed 
were contributing to the problem including the slow expansion of ISAF 
beyond Kabul. MSF, however, was not a signatory to the combined NGO 
letter that included CARE, IRC and Oxfam, in June 2003 that urged the 
expansion of ISAF beyond Kabul to improve the security situation in the 
rest of the country.52  Reasons for the decline in security identified by MSF 
included the lack of Afghan government capacity and funding, 53 the 
reluctance of ISAF to deploy outside of Kabul54 and, most concerning for 
aid agencies, the identification of aid workers by the population and armed 
opposition with the international military forces and the Afghan 
government. According to MSF the “politicization of aid, advocated by the 
international community (with the tacit acceptance of many NGOs)”55 was 
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exemplified by the acceptance of major Afghan Government 
reconstruction contracts by some NGOs.  
However, if NGOs, trapped in the need for funding and visibility, accept 
to become the private contractors of states anxious to delegate political 
responsibilities, they shouldn‟t be surprised if they are seen as 
responsible for any possible failure of the reconstruction process, and 
they will also have to share responsibility for the loss of independent 
humanitarian space in the country.56 
 
MSF also predicted more attacks against aid agencies who presented „soft 
targets‟ to the growing insurgency. Tragically this proved to be true for 
MSF itself. The organisation withdrew from Afghanistan in August 2004 
after five of its workers, three expatriate and two Afghan national staff, 
were brutally murdered in one attack in Badghis province in the 
supposedly safer northwest of the country in June of that year.57 MSF 
found itself in a difficult position in that it had rejected coordination by, or 
involvement with, the Afghan government and international forces but it 
also demanded that the Afghan government bring the killers to justice 
while rejecting the position of other IHNGOs such as CARE that had called 
for ISAF to improve security.58 
 
MSF returned to operations in Afghanistan in 2009, resuming work in 
hospitals in Kabul and Helmand province.59 It is interesting to note that 
while MSF cautiously resumed work in one hospital in Lashkargah, the 
capital of the embattled province of Kandahar, they mentioned the 
numerous other medical facilities in the province that have been 
rehabilitated by ISAF and that are now also targets for the armed 
                                            
56
 Medicins Sans Frontieres, „Afghanistan: Neither Safe nor Stable,‟ (October 15, 2003) 
(para.11.). 
57
 Medicins Sans Frontieres, „Afghanistan: MSF Leaves Country After Staff Killings and 
Threats,‟ (December 16, 2004) 
<http://www.msf.org/msfinternational/invoke.cfm?component=article&objectid=F446039F-
4965-4FB0-9D21CF4C695F80C9&method=full_html> [Accessed January 19, 2010].  
58
 Volker Heins, Non-governmental Organisations in International Society: Struggles Over 
Recognition (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008), pp.134-135. 
59
 Medicins Sans Frontieres, „Afghanistan: MSF Returns After 5 Years,‟ (October 9, 2009) 
<http://doctorswithoutborders.org/news/article.cfm?id=4000&cat=field-news> [Accessed 
January 19, 2010]. 
98 
 
opposition. On the one hand these medical facilities have been improved 
or repaired by the military with their technical capacity, suggesting the 
usefulness of the military in aid and reconstruction work, and yet this also 
makes the medical facilities targets for the insurgents.60 Another point 
regarding the politicisation and securitisation of aid made by MSF and 
other IHNGOs is that this demonstrates that funding and reconstruction 
work is going to areas where there is fighting, such as Helmand and 
Kandahar in the south, rather than to other areas and populations that 
may be in more need of it. 
 
CARE 
CARE had two expatriate staff in Afghanistan who were evacuated during 
the fighting in October and November 2001 and 420 Afghan national staff 
who remained in the country during the war.61  The delivery of food aid 
was seen by CARE as a priority and consequently before the onset of the 
US bombing campaign, a group of IHNGOs including CARE issued a 
public statement calling for all belligerents in the conflict to recognise the 
need for international organisations to deliver food before the onset of the 
war and the harsh Afghan winter and to allow space for these deliveries to 
proceed.62 By late October 2001 CARE was considering cross-border food 
delivery from Pakistan in the south and Tajikistan in the north and by 
airlifts that they wanted to identify as separate from the US military 
humanitarian aid deliveries also being made at this time.63 
 
With the fall of the Taliban, CARE quickly identified security as directly 
related to the humanitarian situation. Involvement with the intervening 
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military forces was inevitable and CARE started to draft guidelines for this 
eventuality advocating the humanitarian effort remain under overall civilian 
control and calling for an international force for “peace-keeping and/ or 
humanitarian purposes” that would come from countries not directly 
involved in the war against the Taliban.64 CARE also attempted to 
delineate the respective roles for humanitarian agencies and the military, 
suggesting the military focus on training Afghan security forces, disposal 
of mines and unexploded ordinance, repairing roads and runways and 
airlifting aid into inaccessible locations while local and international relief 
agencies did the actual delivery of aid.65 This separation of roles is still a 
frequent recommendation from most IHNGOs in relation to their concerns 
about the quality of work, blurring of roles and overall politicisation of aid 
caused by the military delivery of assistance. This continued to be a theme 
that ran through many of CARE‟s policy statements and press releases in 
the years following the end of Taliban rule.66 
 
Despite its non-governmental position, CARE did make statements about, 
and advocate for, political and military action. It advocated for the 
formation of a “broad-based, multi-ethnic and fully representative” 
government.67  While a functioning government was a clear pre-condition 
for future stability and reconstruction, CARE‟s support for the international 
intervention and state-building agenda and consequently the new Afghan 
government would prove problematic if the government did not achieve 
broad acceptance and armed opponents came to identify the organisation 
with the government and its international backers. CARE also called for 
the extension of ISAF beyond Kabul to improve the security situation for 
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the Afghan people and for aid workers through 2002 and 2003. Security 
was especially a concern at that time in the north where government and 
international forces were absent. Paul Barker, director of CARE in 
Afghanistan in June 2002, made the point that “whatever the cost of 
expanding ISAF, the cost of not doing so will be far greater in the long 
run.”68 
 
The faltering of the international commitment to Afghanistan was also 
highlighted when CARE pointed out in September 2002 that only 5 percent 
of the aid that had been pledged at the international donors‟ meeting in 
Tokyo in January 2002 had been delivered and no large infrastructure 
projects had been undertaken.69  When the UN Security Council did 
mandate an expansion of ISAF in October 2003, CARE also 
recommended that the PRTs focus on security sector reform rather than 
on reconstruction and that they be renamed „Provincial Security Teams.‟70 
CARE also noted that the new German PRT at that time was deployed to 
Kunduz province, where no attacks against NGOs had been recorded.71 
This demonstrates a disconnect in terms of priorities between donor 
governments and their  PRTs with those of NGOs in terms of how the two 
groups want to see military forces deployed and aid money spent.  
 
CARE has experienced a number of security incidents in Afghanistan. A 
CARE office in Logar was ransacked in May 2005 during riots that a 
CARE staff member described as “anti-government, and, to a certain 
extent, anti-NGO riots.”72 The staff member from CARE also described the 
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deterioration of security for NGOs that had occurred through 2004 and 
2005.73 In May 2005 an expatriate staff member of CARE was 
kidnapped.74  In May 2006 its office in Kabul was ransacked and burned 
during riots sparked by a fatal traffic accident involving a US army truck. 
CARE played down the possible anti-NGO sentiment behind the attack 
stating it was the location of the NGO‟s office that led to the attack.75 
However, anti–foreigner and anti–NGO sentiment was also believed to be 
an element of the frustration over unemployment and the slow progress of 
reconstruction that fuelled the riots. Afghan government resentment 
towards some aid agencies had grown due to competition between NGOs 
and the government for funds from international donors which had led to 
criticism from Afghan government ministers, notably the head of the 
Ministry of Planning in 2003 and 2004, who claimed they would become 
targets to be attacked for wasting money. 76 The lack of popularity of 
NGOs with Afghans at a local and government level for the slow 
reconstruction process was also identified by staff of CARE.77  
 
Resentment towards NGOs was also growing among Afghans 
disillusioned by little tangible improvement in their livelihoods and angered 
by the perceptions of corruption, wealth and culturally insensitive lifestyles 
of NGO staff.78  CARE has maintained a light expatriate footprint which 
dispels, at least for them, some of the criticisms levelled at the “expat-
heavy” NGOs.79 In 2004 it had eight expatriate staff and 800 Afghan 
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national staff,80 and today it claims to still have 99 percent local staff out of 
its 900 staff in Afghanistan.81 
 
Most of CARE‟s current work in Afghanistan has a longer term 
development focus. In an effort to avoid aid dependency, by 2003 CARE 
was operating cash for work schemes in Kabul wherein recipients received 
payment for work such as collection of rubbish, sewing of school uniforms 
and teaching hygiene courses to families.82 Of the ten major CARE run 
projects in 2009 in Afghanistan outlined on its website, one provides 
emergency food relief, while three are for rehabilitation programmes 
including housing for returning refugees and six are for development 
projects including assistance for widows in Kabul, secondary schools for 
girls and programmes for young mothers.83 The development projects 
demonstrate a central concern of CARE‟s policy and programmes which is 
the welfare of women and girls, and this is especially significant in 
Afghanistan considering the harsh Taliban policies towards women and 
the generally conservative nature of Afghanistan‟s Islamic culture. An 
example of CARE‟s policy focus on the welfare of women was a survey 
and report it conducted and released in September 2005 outlining 
expectations and concerns held by women towards the upcoming 
parliamentary and provincial council elections held that month. CARE 
referred to the elections as “yet another important milestone in the 
country‟s long road to full democracy.” 84 The statement positions CARE 
as clearly having a stance regarding the governance and democratisation 
of the country and therefore also aligning it with the internationally backed 
state-building project and Afghan government. The complex, insecure and 
heavily politicised situation in Afghanistan with AOGs attacking this 
process put IHNGOs like CARE in a difficult position when trying to walk 
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the line between neutrality and impartiality and support for a political 
ideology such as liberal democracy.  
 
A significant Afghan government programme that CARE is a facilitating 
partner for is the National Solidarity Programme (NSP) run through the 
Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) and funded by 
the World Bank.85  CARE, the IRC, Oxfam and other NGOs and UN 
agencies work through the NSP to assist Community Development 
Councils (CDCs) with planning, implementing and managing 
reconstruction programmes. The CDC‟s reconstruction projects fit within 
the model of locally driven and community-based development favoured 
by CARE and the organisation undertakes these programmes in six 
provinces.86 
 
The International Rescue Committee (IRC)  
Prior to late 2001 the IRC ran its programmes from across the border in 
Pakistan.87 The IRC undertook emergency relief food aid, rural 
rehabilitation programmes and cash for work schemes to returning 
refugees and internally displaced people in the north and west of 
Afghanistan following the end of Taliban rule up to March 2003.88 The 
security situation was, even then, the primary obstacle to the 
implementation of these programmes.89 During the winter of 2001-2002 
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the IRC was able to deliver food aid to the famine affected Hazarajat 
region of central Afghanistan using fleets of donkeys.90  
 
Since 2003 the IRC has been focusing on longer term development 
projects especially within the NSP and also with education and child 
protection programmes within the respective Afghan government 
ministries and with funding from USAID.91 This is reflected in the IRC‟s 
spending in Afghanistan which, by March 2007, was on governance (34%) 
and health (32%) followed by education and child protection (19%), 
training (12%) and HIV (3%).92 The IRC‟s emphasis on community based 
education had, by August 2007, enabled the integration of 500 community 
based schools into the Afghan education system.93  
 
From 2003 onwards the IRC was involved in implementing the NSP with 
the Afghan government in the south-eastern provinces of Khost and 
Logar94 and now also in Nangahar in the southeast plus Herat in the 
northwest.95  The southeast of Afghanistan was, and still is, a difficult 
region for the government and NGO operations. Factors such as its 
proximity to the Pakistan border, its largely Pashtun ethnicity and an 
ongoing insurgency meant the NSP was going to be a challenge for the 
IRC to implement as the NSP has a political dimension in extending the 
influence of the Afghan government through the MRRD. The IRC has 
focussed on community driven development through consultation with the 
CDCs, although it has identified disconnects between the CDCs and the 
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central government, a problem that has increased with the insurgency and 
the government‟s legitimacy problems.96  Community driven development 
that has been promoted by the IRC has been found to work best in 
relatively stable environments.97 As the insurgency against the Afghan 
government and its international backers has stepped up, the IRC has 
attempted to find ways of maintaining involvement with the NSP while also 
trying to distance themselves in the eyes of the local communities from 
direct association with the central government.98 To promote this, the IRC 
has been using community outreach programmes consisting of Afghan 
national staff and including a Mullah who leads the community in prayers 
and speaks to the community about how the IRC‟s programmes are 
consistent with Islamic teaching and the Koran.99  
 
The IRC has been subjected to serious attacks in 2007 and 2008. A 
national staff member and his driver were killed in Logar province in July 
2007,100 and three expatriate female staff and their driver were killed in 
another attack in Logar in August 2008.101 The Country Director for the 
IRC said in December 2009 that the security situation had seriously 
deteriorated since 2006 with large parts of the country, especially in the 
south and east, becoming inaccessible to expatriate staff and increasingly 
so to national staff as well, with travel by air necessary due to the dangers 
of ambush presented by land travel.102  
 
Oxfam 
During the war to remove the Taliban in October 2001, Oxfam, like other 
IHNGOs, expressed concern over the combination of humanitarian aid 
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drops with the US bombing campaign. The policy director of Oxfam at that 
time stated “our view is no air drops, no leaflets...just give the UN the 
means to do its job.”103 According to a press release from January 2002, 
Oxfam was “working through both Afghan staff and partners” in the 
delivery of emergency food aid.104 It also expressed concerns about the 
security situation and called for effective coordination between donors and 
the Afghan interim government and NGOs.105  
 
In the immediate aftermath of the end of Taliban rule, Oxfam focused on 
food for work and reconstruction projects such as schools, roads and 
clinics.106 An Afghanistan Information Management Services (AIMS) 
survey in 2003 revealed the majority of Oxfam‟s projects in Afghanistan 
were focussed on food security (7) and food aid (6) followed by community 
development and education (5 projects on each).107 From 2001 to 2007 
Oxfam worked on water distribution and sanitation projects in the southern 
provinces of Zabul and Kandahar as well as water and roading projects in 
the central province of Daikundi (Uruzgan) and Badakshan in the far 
northeast.108 Oxfam‟s activities are now focussed on capacity building of 
community driven development, gender equality and fostering Afghan civil 
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society.109 Like CARE and the IRC they are also involved in the NSP, 
though only in Daikundi province at present.110 
 
In May 2002 Oxfam released a briefing paper regarding the role of aid and 
the GWOT and presented a ten point plan for international action, number 
one of which called for the international community to fulfil its commitment 
to rebuild Afghanistan.111 The language of this document clearly places aid 
and development at the heart of the international security agenda when it 
states “Afghanistan highlighted the need to deal with the root cause of 
conflict and insecurity” and that “addressing fundamental injustices is not 
only a moral imperative; it is also in the security interests of the world 
community.”112  
 
A bomb exploded outside Oxfam‟s offices in Kabul in November 2005 and 
it has been unable to work in Helmand province in the south where British 
troops were, and still are, fighting the Taliban insurgency.113  However, 
relative to the other agencies in this study, Oxfam has been fortunate in 
having no recorded expatriate or national staff fatalities due to attacks on 
its workers. 
 
Oxfam has been vocal regarding policy issues in Afghanistan. Alongside 
CARE and the IRC it supported the combined NGO call for expansion of 
ISAF in 2003.114 In 2007 it made a submission to the UK House of 
Commons Development Committee inquiry into development assistance in 
Afghanistan regarding issues such as aid effectiveness, governance, 
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health and education.115 It has also expressed concerns about PRTs, 
stating that they have gone beyond their security role by engaging in 
development work to the detriment of the Afghan government and NGOs, 
they have blurred the distinction between humanitarian and military actors 
and that the work they have done has been of questionable quality.116  
 
Common themes and areas of divergence for IHNGOs in 
Afghanistan 2001-2009 
Attacks against staff in a compromised security environment 
All of the five organisations have experienced some degree of violence 
directed at them, from attacks against their offices and the projects they 
work on through to kidnapping and targeted killing of both national and 
expatriate staff. The IHNGO in this study most dramatically affected by 
these attacks was MSF since it not only lost five staff in one attack, but, as 
a consequence, it withdrew from all operations in the country from 2004 to 
2009. The ICRC and IRC have also lost staff, but have stayed operational 
in the country. CARE has experienced kidnappings and attacks against its 
offices. Oxfam‟s operations have been affected by security threats but 
without fatal attacks against its staff.117 An increase in attacks, especially 
in the last three years, against NGO staff has been part of the 
deteriorating security situation in the country. The Country Director for the 
IRC stated that the security situation had grown worse since the fighting 
season (approximately April to October) in 2006 and that 2009 had been 
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the worst yet.118 In terms of the impact of insecurity on NGOs, the 
Afghanistan NGO Safety Office (ANSO) reported that in 2009 the 
incidence of attacks against NGOs had doubled since 2007.119 
 
Opposition to the intervening military’s involvement in aid and 
reconstruction work 
All the IHNGOs surveyed have made statements objecting to the use of 
aid as a means of counter-insurgency that advances military and political 
goals. IHNGO concerns about this were first apparent in the objections to 
the use of humanitarian aid air drops during the Coalition war against the 
Taliban in 2001. Since then IHNGOs have continued to express concerns 
about PRTs and other forms of military provided aid and reconstruction 
work. The problems the IHNGOs identify with the military involvement will 
be summarised for analysis in the next chapter. The major themes briefly 
are threats to IHNGO security due to the blurring of military and 
humanitarian roles, concerns about the quality of the work done by the 
military and contractors and the prioritising of money and reconstruction 
work to regions for political objectives rather than out of need. 
 
Involvement with the Afghan government as implementing/ 
facilitating partners 
CARE, the IRC and Oxfam as multi-mandate agencies carry out 
development work and all three undertake projects with the Afghan 
government. The National Solidarity Programme is a major example of 
this, as are other projects in education, health and infrastructure such as 
water and sanitation. MSF and the ICRC avoid most development 
activities and focus on short term medical and health care while keeping 
independent from the central government. However the ICRC does 
provide education in International Humanitarian Law to the ANA.120 
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Divergence in IHNGO policy positions and statements 
The clearest divergence between the humanitarian relief IHNGOs (ICRC 
and MSF) and the multi-mandate IHNGOs (CARE, IRC and Oxfam) is in 
their respective positions on political and military issues. The ICRC and 
MSF have not openly advocated expansion of intervening military forces 
for security purposes, whereas the other agencies have. MSF has 
however made clear statements opposing military involvement with 
humanitarian assistance,121 in line with the CARE, IRC and Oxfam 
positions while not being part of joint NGO statements that have either 
called for ISAF expansion122 or opposed the military use of aid as a 
counter-insurgency tool.123 
 
Conclusion 
One issue is very clear from the perspective of all IHNGOs in Afghanistan; 
the security situation for aid agencies has deteriorated greatly in the last 
nine years.124 There have been attacks against all the IHNGOs regardless 
of their multi-mandate or humanitarian focus. For example both MSF 
(emergency medical aid) and the IRC (multi-mandate, aid and 
development) have been the victims of fatal armed attacks. All the 
organisations have expressed concerns about military involvement in aid 
and development work, often identifying it as undermining their own 
security and acceptance by the local population as well as questioning its 
efficiency and quality.  
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However, other factors compromising IHNGO security need to be 
considered besides the blurring of the lines issue. One important 
development is the spread of the conflict in Afghanistan in the last three 
years which means that NGOs and AOGs are coming into contact with 
each other more often.125 Negative perceptions that are held by Afghans 
of NGOs have been identified and these have been linked to a wider 
disillusionment with the international backed state-building project, 
government corruption and a lack of tangible improvement in peoples‟ 
daily lives.126 Deliberate, politically motivated targeting of NGOs by AOGs 
has also been identified by ANSO and it has even been suggested the 
AOGs are differentiating in who they attack.127 Other global political 
factors, such as the invasion of Iraq in 2003 in the continuing GWOT, also 
influence events in Afghanistan. Attacks against the UN and the ICRC 
occurred in both Iraq and Afghanistan after the 2003 invasion of Iraq.128 
The Iraq war also took international, especially US, military and financial 
attention away from Afghanistan for some years,129 and this also 
contributed to the worsening security scenario there.  
 
The situation for IHNGOs in Afghanistan, therefore, now needs to be put 
back into the wider context of military intervention and post-conflict state-
building in the era of the GWOT. The ongoing conflict there indicates that 
the international community as whole may have, prematurely and 
optimistically, assumed the situation had stabilised. As Antonio Donini 
suggests, both donors and aid agencies “willingly accepted the notion that 
Afghanistan was in a post-conflict situation, and therefore the role of 
external actors, including NGOs, was to support the government.”130 The 
government they have supported has serious legitimacy and corruption 
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issues and is backed by a heavy international military presence that is set 
to increase in 2010.
113 
 
Chapter Nine: IHNGOs in Afghanistan – State-
Building and the New Humanitarianism 
 
The use of aid and development action as part of counter-insurgency 
strategy by international forces leading to the blurring of the lines between 
aid workers and the military has been singled out by IHNGOs as a major 
reason for the IHNGOs‟ loss of security, acceptance and access in parts of 
Afghanistan.1 This study has argued that the problem has deeper roots 
and other contributing factors.  These are:  
 The overlap of political values shared by IHNGOs and states;  
 The emerging role of IHNGOs in the process of state-building 
since the end of the Cold War;  
 The adoption of features of humanitarian action by states to 
further their political ends;  
 The use of aid and development activity by, and the assumed 
role of humanitarian actors within, military counter-insurgency 
strategy; 
 The assumption by humanitarian, political and military actors that 
the conflict had ended. 
 
The blurring of already thin lines: State security and human security 
At a fundamental and philosophical level there is a set of values about 
development, democracy and human rights that are shared by both 
western intervening states and western based IHNGOs.2 Therefore 
IHNGOs and states tend to want the same overall outcomes for an 
intervention such as peace and some form of liberal democratic 
                                            
1
 See, for example, Action Aid et al, „Caught in the Conflict: Civilians and the International 
Security Strategy in Afghanistan,‟ p.6; CARE, „Key Messages on the Present Situation in 
Afghanistan (February 3 2004) 
<http://www.care.org/newsroom/specialreports/afghanistan/02032004_key_afghanistan.p
df> [Accessed February 10, 2010], (p.2);  Christian Aid, „The Politics of Poverty,‟ (p.48); 
Nellie Bristol, „Military Incursions into Aid Work Anger Humanitarian Groups,‟; Fabrice 
Weissman, „Military Humanitarianism: A Deadly Confusion,‟; Oxfam, „Troop Surge in 
Afghanistan Must Not Endanger Civilians,‟ (April 3 2009) 
<http://www.oxfam.org/en/pressroom/pressrelease/2009-04-03/afghanistan-troop-surge-
must-not-endanger-civilians> [Accessed February 10, 2010], (para.12.). 
2
 Hugo Slim, „With or Against?‟,p.34. 
114 
 
government that recognises basic human rights. The realist concern for 
security drives the state, while the quest for human security drives the 
IHNGOs. The means by which humanitarians and states achieve these 
ends however are more contested.3 IHNGOs want a clear separation of 
military and humanitarian action,4 while the military want to deploy the two 
things together as part of counter-insurgency strategy.5 The assumption 
that Afghanistan was a post-conflict environment where IHNGOs 
consequently politicised themselves by direct involvement in government 
and donor state programmes has also contributed to their security 
problems.6 IHNGOs have been caught up in a rapidly spreading conflict,7 
in which their security has been severely compromised by the perception 
that they are part of the state-building project that is opposed by a growing 
insurgency. 
 
State-building and new humanitarianism 
These problems flow from the position IHNGOs now find themselves in as 
part of the management system for areas of instability and conflict around 
the world. A feature of this management system is the new model of state-
building and humanitarianism that has evolved with the interventions of the 
1990s that emphasises a lighter, but integrated, aid, political and military 
footprint.8  Also referred to as coherence,9 or the comprehensive 
approach,10 this development has the aid community and military forces 
concerned with achieving results but with less staff deployed (less 
expatriate staff in NGOs, small troop numbers in PRTs) winning local 
acceptance (NGO community outreach, PRTs winning hearts and minds) 
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and building local capacity (NGO training programmes, international forces 
training the ANA/ANP). The NGO side of this humanitarian synergy with 
the political and military has been referred to as “new humanitarianism”, 
which involves the “integration of human rights and peace building into the 
humanitarian orbit; the ending of the distinction between development and 
humanitarian relief; and the rejection of the principle of neutrality.” 11 The 
multi-mandate IHNGOs therefore have increasingly become involved in 
activities beyond short-term humanitarian relief. The involvement of these 
IHNGOs in advocating for or against, and participating with, military 
humanitarian interventions since the end of the Cold War has further 
involved them politically in the “international community‟s world ordering 
agenda.”12 
 
IHNGOs within the state-building project in Afghanistan 
The conflict setting post-Taliban rule has placed the IHNGOs in a 
dilemma, as some have demonstrated both support for, and criticism of, 
the state-building and liberal democratic process advanced by the new 
Afghan government and intervening forces, or have attempted to remain 
entirely neutral. The multi-mandate IHNGOs advocated for the expansion 
of ISAF forces as a means of improving security but they have also 
attempted to fence off assistance activities as the preserve of aid 
agencies. A tension exists in that they recommend the military focus on 
security and security sector reform, but the PRTs, Coalition and ISAF 
counter-insurgency strategy has a focus on „hearts and minds‟ operations 
and aid is clearly a tool or even a „weapon‟ in this endeavour.13. 
 
The multi-mandate IHNGOs, CARE, IRC and Oxfam, have all worked as 
implementing/facilitating partners with the UN and the Afghan government 
to some extent, especially in the NSP, health and education programmes. 
These programmes have been identified as the most successful by the 
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IHNGOs,14 but they have also been targeted by the AOGs.15 The ICRC 
has been able to maintain some acceptance from the armed opposition,16 
which may be due to its role as an intermediary in negotiations 
surrounding hostages, prisoners and the wounded.17 MSF has remained 
politically apart from intervening states, the Afghan government and other 
IHNGOs, but it withdrew after the serious attacks against it in 2004. 
 
The role of external states in state-building 
Donor and intervening states also have a role in the new light footprint 
model of state-building. The PRTs are an example of this, in that they 
were an attempt to extend ISAF without deploying large numbers of staff 
and resources.18 The PRTs with their individual national mandates and 
caveats allow contributing states to keep control of where they are 
deployed, channel aid through these units, and also to present their 
actions to their domestic populations with a humanitarian and 
development face.19  PRTs, with their combined military and civilian 
component and wide range of military and development activities, are an 
extension of the comprehensive state-building approach deployed at the 
provincial level.20 
 
Development policy is now seen as part of security, trade, and foreign 
policy for many OECD states. This is well summarised by this report to the 
NZ government on NZAID‟s mandate and policy settings: 
Along with foreign policy, trade policy and security/defence policy, 
OECD governments are increasingly seeing development policy as a 
key part of their range of external interventions. Maximum effectiveness 
of each element and maximum coherence among all elements of the 
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external intervention tool-kit is highly desirable to achieve foreign and 
security policy goals in an efficient way.21 
 
PRTs:  The acceptable face of state-building at home and overseas 
From a state-centric viewpoint, military involvement in overseas 
interventions reflects on that state and its military forces internationally and 
at home. For example the recent controversy over NZ SAS involvement in 
incidents in Afghanistan prompted the NZ government to break with 
tradition and acknowledge SAS actions since reports and photographs of 
them were appearing in the international and local media.22 If the actions 
of its military overseas can be presented by a government in a more 
humane light, for example PRTs providing aid and demonstrating friendly 
relations with the local population, this may be more acceptable to a 
domestic constituency concerned about potential casualties and the falling 
popularity for their military involvement supporting a struggling foreign 
government. For example, in 2007 the NZ PRT in Bamiyan was reported 
by the NZ media to have “built a boys' school, five police stations, bridges, 
a new hospital ward and a water supply system.”23 The positive public 
relations aspect of these deployments helps to explain the move into 
NGO-type activities by the militaries of intervening states which has 
consequently encroached on the humanitarian space for IHNGOs. The 
importance of these deployments and how they are presented in the 
domestic politics of intervening states was clearly demonstrated by the 
recent collapse of the Dutch government over the question of the 
continuing deployment of their forces in Uruzgan province. The Dutch 
have had a considerable 21 fatalities in Afghanistan since 2006. The 
governor of Uruzgan, however, was reported in the media highlighting 
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their assistance role: "they are constructing bridges, schools, roads and 
assisting in many other educational projects."24 
 
Aid and development as counter-insurgency 
The IHNGOs have identified military involvement in aid and reconstruction 
work in much of their writing and this would suggest they see it as the 
principle reason for the shrinking of their humanitarian space.  A briefing 
paper to NATO about the situation in Afghanistan from CARE, IRC, Oxfam 
and eight other NGOs, released in April 2009, stated that the NGOs wish 
to “preserve the civil-military distinction, which is essential for the security 
of humanitarian actors and their ability to deliver assistance to people in 
need”.25  As an example of this, the country director of the IRC pointed out 
that the fighting, and therefore lack of access, tended to move around 
corresponding to Taleban and IF/ANA movements, “we are not in 
Helmand and Kandahar as an organisation it‟s a war zone,” but, “we are in 
Paktia, Loghar and Khost which have the same levels of Taliban presence 
and control but not quite such pronounced fighting yet.”26 This is indicative 
of the asymmetric and intermittent nature of the conflict and the difficulties 
for IHNGOs in maintaining consistent access to, and acceptance by, those 
in need.  
 
The Coalition/ISAF counter-insurgency strategy includes a role for NGOs 
in its phased “shape, clear, hold and build” strategy.27 The early phases 
are supposed to be completed by the IF and ANA and the build phase by 
civilian agencies including NGOs. “Once the district is secured, the theory 
goes; the UN and its agencies, the government, and the NGOs come in to 
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transform physical security into more durable human security.”28 However, 
PRTs29 and private contractors30 have often been employed in the most 
difficult areas to provide reconstruction work. 
 
Post-conflict reconstruction: One model does not fit all 
While convergence of military and humanitarian ends, despite 
disagreement about the means, may have existed in an intervention such 
as in Kosovo, there are fundamental differences in the case of 
Afghanistan.  The Kosovo intervention, for example, occurred in a small 
geographical space and the 90% ethnic Albanian majority supported the 
expulsion of Serbian forces, therefore resistance was minimal to 
intervention after Serbian withdrawal, and NGOs could engage without 
being seen as part of the occupation forces. As Mark Duffield suggests 
“post-intervention demands place great responsibilities on civilian aid 
personnel and draw then directly into volatile and exposed political 
processes,”31 and this is very much the case in Afghanistan. The country 
is much larger than Kosovo,32  there is a long history of conflict and ample 
access to arms,33 there is a large armed group evicted from power that is 
still fighting, gaining recruits and support,34 and the central government 
remains weak.35 
 
The assumption by political, military and assistance actors in Afghanistan 
that they were operating in a post-conflict environment after December 
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2001 has contributed to the security problems faced by IHNGOs up to the 
present day. The early endorsement of the new government despite its 
inclusion of former warlords, lack of control over the countryside and a thin 
or non-existent international military presence to support it has had serious 
consequences. 
 
The slow deployment of ISAF, the cautious approach of NATO troop 
contributing countries after the fall of the Taliban, and the US distraction 
with the wider GWOT and the war in Iraq all allowed the security 
environment to further deteriorate. These factors meant IHNGOs could not 
operate under the umbrella of military implemented security, and instead 
the insurgency has spread with greatly compromised operating conditions 
for IHNGOs. 
 
The consequences for IHNGOs of state-building in a 
politicised and ongoing conflict 
Loss of humanitarian space and access in a spreading conflict 
Compared to the present situation and the escalation in numbers of 
attacks against NGO staff, the Taliban period was safer for aid workers.36 
An ICRC staff member interviewed for this study had spoken to fellow staff 
that had been present during Taliban rule who believed that security for 
NGOs was better in that time.37 This is not to say Taliban rule in any way 
was inherently better for NGOs, there was a lot of confrontation over 
human and gender rights issues, but most of the country, apart from the 
frontlines with the Northern Alliance, was not experiencing ongoing 
insurgency and conflict with external intervening forces as was the case in 
the Soviet and now post 2001 periods. By late 2009 ANSO stated that 
there had been attacks against NGOs in every province in the country and 
estimated that AOGs were able to “control or exert effective influence over 
40-59% of the country” and “maintain a permanent presence in 80%, and 
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have a presence in at least 97%.”38 Access to those in need has clearly 
been compromised by the security situation with large parts of the country 
inaccessible to aid agencies.  
 
Other actors involved in development and reconstruction 
It is important to note that NGOs receive only 10-15 percent of donor aid 
to Afghanistan.39 In regard to the host of private contractors, PRTs and 
government agencies involved in development and reconstruction that are 
receiving much of the rest of that funding, the country director of the IRC 
stated “there are a lot of people out there trying to win the hearts and 
minds through programming inputs with massive variance on quality.”40 
This is indicative of a change in the nature of aid and development, who 
provides it and why. A lack of security and the move towards privatisation 
and managerial approaches in post-Cold War interventions have led to the 
arrival of new private for profit actors41 operating in the space that was 
once the preserve of IHNGOs.42 Private contractors, both local and 
international, are moving into the space left by IHNGOs due to security, 
their refusal to be coordinated with political and military action, or the 
prioritisation of donor funds to where their militaries are operating. As an 
example, contractors are often hired by PRTs, and IHNGOs have 
frequently criticised the expense and quality of their work.43  
 
Options for IHNGOs in the ongoing conflict environment 
The consequences of the integrated state-building approach in a conflict 
situation have led IHNGOs to examine their operational security 
procedures and their wider policies in Afghanistan and internationally.  
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Changes in operational security 
Many IHNGOs have developed training in security procedures for 
personnel, sometimes delivered by private security contractors (PSCs).44 
Other actions have included moving in convoys, increased physical 
security around offices, and outsourcing to other contractors. Remote 
management, wherein expatriate and senior staff manage programmes, 
but are not physically present, results in more risks for national staff.45  
 
Withdrawal of assistance or of organisations 
During Taliban times NGOs, such as Oxfam, halted work on projects in 
protest at the Taliban‟s harsh edicts against women,46 and the UN and 
other agencies withdrew staff during periods of danger, such as following 
the 1998 US missile strikes.47 MSF withdrew entirely from Afghanistan 
following the killing of five of its staff in 2004. Most IHNGOs however, have 
remained despite deteriorating security and attacks, since withdrawal will 
not assist those in need and possibly private contractors and other military 
and government actors would replace them if they did withdraw. A 
coordinated withdrawal or temporary suspension of activity by a coalition 
of the major national and international NGOs would have a negative 
impact on the population or the government and likely be seen as a victory 
by the AOGs and open up space to AOGs, the military and/or private 
contractors. 
 
Security personnel and private security contractors (PSCs) 
The IHNGOs have now employed dedicated security staff, though their 
roles tend to be concerned with training, assessment and operating 
procedures rather than explicitly acting as armed guards. The IRC, for 
example, now has five dedicated security positions within the organisation, 
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although they also need to have had five years experience in the 
humanitarian sector.48 
 
PSCs have been employed by IHNGOs including CARE and the ICRC in 
other theatres such as in DRC.49 However, PSCs tend to be employed for 
staff training and risk assessment rather than direct armed protection.50 
Paid armed security is a problem for IHNGOs as it is at odds with their 
non-profit and nonviolent principles.51 Also, they are concerned that direct 
armed security actors could contribute further to conflict and PSCs are 
often employed by intervening states and their contractors, so there is a 
danger of the PSCs also being a politicised force.52 
 
Interagency reporting and security monitoring 
Regular reporting of security incidents, monitoring, updates and analysis 
of trends in the security environment are provided to NGOs through the 
Afghanistan NGO Safety Office (ANSO).53 This kind of information can 
help NGOs to make decisions regarding where and when they operate 
with regard to the security environment. 
 
A coalition umbrella for humanitarian action separate from 
development 
Humanitarian agencies could operate under an umbrella organisation with 
its own logo, separate from politicised development. This humanitarian 
„consortium‟ would adhere strictly to the principles of impartiality, neutrality 
and independence as does the ICRC. For multi-mandate agencies there 
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would be the option for their short-term relief activities to be channelled 
through this grouping and apart from their state-building development 
work. This approach met with success in Cambodia in 1979, when 
European NGOs such as Oxfam and the Red Cross decided to bypass 
Cold War politics and the UN‟s non-recognition of the post Khmer Rouge 
government by forming a consortium of humanitarian NGOs.54 
 
Conclusion 
As the list of options suggests, there is really “a dearth of viable options to 
keep staff secure in the most volatile contexts, where humanitarian aid is 
most needed.”55 The consortium idea is the most innovative idea that has 
been recommended and could be combined with use of the media in the 
region and dialogue with all belligerents in an effort to take back some 
humanitarian space.56 Overall, the light footprint model of state-building 
and the development of new humanitarianism have paved the way for the 
integrated or coherent approaches that have been implemented in 
Afghanistan. However, when intervening forces who share common 
development goals with, and who are based in the same western states 
as, IHNGOs become belligerents in an ongoing conflict, this severely 
compromises the IHNGOs‟ security.
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Chapter Ten: Conclusion 
Summary 
Realism, GCS and post-colonial Marxist criticism 
This study has outlined the development of three principle theories that 
help explain the relationship between states and NGOs: realism, GCS and 
post-colonial Marxist analysis. The first emphasises state security and 
national interests.  The second champions human security, human rights, 
and state sovereignty being conditional on how states treat their citizens. 
The third is critical of imperialism by states and by the western based 
universalism of GCS and its cooption into the national, realist, interests of 
western developed states.  
 
Post-Cold War humanitarian interventions 
The interventions of the 1990s demonstrated how the state based concern 
with power and security highlighted in realist theory had involved NGOs, 
explained by the more recent theory of GCS, in the management and 
mismanagement of humanitarian crises and interventions. The Marxist 
post-colonial critique identified the merging of these two sets of actors into 
a new form of imperialism that combines state interests and the furthering 
of neo-liberal economics and democracy with aid and development 
implemented through NGOs. This coherence or integration of IHNGOs into 
the political security agenda of the developed western states has had its 
most stark test in the brutal conflict in Afghanistan since 2001. 
 
Afghanistan 
Afghanistan presents a particularly difficult environment for NGOs and 
military actors, in terms of its geography, climate, ethnic divisions, weak 
central government and long history of conflict. The few solidifying 
features of the Afghan state include its Islamic religion and tendency to 
unite against foreign invasion. IHNGOs have been involved in and around 
Afghanistan in the last thirty years of conflict. Most, with the exception of 
the ICRC, were politically part of the US and Pakistani backed Cold War 
effort supporting the mujahedeen against the Soviets in the 1980s, while 
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later operating with some degree of autonomy in the 1990s prior to the 
2001 war. The US and its allies, the former backers of the war against the 
Soviets, are now the occupying forces. The new internationally backed 
Afghan government has had serious issues related to corruption and the 
cooption of former warlords. The ISAF was also slow to deploy beyond 
Kabul in the first few years following the end of the Taliban regime. These 
factors have fuelled resentment and provided space for a growing 
insurgency and a corresponding deterioration in the security situation that 
continues to the present day. 
 
The IHNGOs 
The five IHNGOs chosen for this study can be divided into the Dunantist 
ICRC and MSF, who focus on short-term humanitarian relief aid and the 
Wilsonian, multi-mandate CARE, IRC and Oxfam, that provide both short-
term humanitarian aid and longer term development. These agencies‟ 
development goals, sometimes also shared by intervening donor 
governments, have a focus on removing the underlying causes of poverty 
and inequality. Involvement by the multi-mandate agencies with 
governments, especially in providing longer-term development in an 
intervention where there is continued armed opposition, has the potential 
to impact negatively on their access, acceptance and security. The ICRC 
is funded by states that are party to the Geneva Conventions, while MSF 
is largely independently funded. Both these organisations focus on short-
term humanitarian aid. 
 
PRTs: The role of military provided aid and development 
PRTs exemplify the evolution of a state-building model that combines 
military counter-insurgency, development, aid and reconstruction. The use 
of PRTs in Afghanistan supports the thesis that development aid and 
security are merging to secure unstable regions. PRTs with limited 
manpower and resources were intended to fill a number of gaps in the 
political, military and development vacuum following the 2001 regime 
change. PRT tasks included development, reconstruction, extending the 
legitimacy and control of the Afghan government and security sector 
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reform. The PRTs were intended to do this with few personnel and have 
been spread thinly over Afghanistan. The attempt to win acceptance and 
intelligence through the PRT‟s use of quick impact projects has made aid 
and development a counterinsurgency tool. The PRTs have been heavily 
criticised by the IHNGOs for blurring the lines between humanitarians and 
military actors, the poor quality of some of their reconstruction work, and 
for prioritising aid and development for political ends rather than providing 
it on the basis of need as espoused by IHNGOs.  
 
Consequently, PRTs have further shrunk the neutral space that IHNGOs 
are already struggling to maintain because of the politicisation of their 
activities as part of the security and state-building process within which 
they are operating. Conversely, the PRTs have not greatly improved 
security for much of the population and the IHNGOs. While the military 
would like IHNGOs to coordinate with them as part of counter-insurgency 
strategy by providing aid and development to areas cleared of insurgents, 
the IHNGOs have attempted to remain distinct from this project. 
 
IHNGO experiences in Afghanistan since 2001 
Over the last nine years there have been many, sometimes fatal, attacks 
against IHNGO staff. In the case of one IHNGO, MSF, this resulted in 
complete withdrawal from the country between 2004 and 2009. While 
IHNGOs have focussed on the blurring of the lines between aid workers 
and the military that they identify as being caused by military involvement 
in aid and development, this study argues other factors have contributed 
to the deterioration of their security.  
 
They are caught in an ongoing and spreading conflict where they are 
perceived to varying degrees by the AOGs as involved with the 
international and Afghan government state-building agenda. Multi-
mandate IHNGOs champion democracy, human and gender rights; values 
also shared by the intervening governments and opposed by the AOGs.  
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State-building and the new humanitarianism 
IHNGOs that act as implementing and facilitating partners with 
international and Afghan government programmes further involve 
themselves in a politicised situation, wherein they are part of the wider 
integrated or coherent approach to state-building that has developed since 
the 1990s. This version of state-building envisions political, military and 
humanitarian action working in a complimentary synergy. 
 
State-centric realism and GCS‟s cross border universalism and concern 
with human security have been united by this coming together of the light 
footprint version of state-building and new humanitarianism‟s focus on 
development, rights and the underlying causes of poverty. Another factor 
that has impacted on IHNGOs in the state-building process has been the 
growing use by government and military forces of private for profit 
contractors to undertake development work that closely resembles that of 
NGOs.  
 
The consequences of merging security with aid and 
development 
This study has identified the merging of security concerns with aid and 
development as part of the post-Cold War and GWOT security agenda. 
The recognition by the UN in the 1990s that aid and development could 
help reduce the factors that lead to conflict and instability and improve 
international security has now been incorporated into the foreign and 
security policies of developed western states.1 IHNGOs have become one 
aspect of this through their support for democratic governance, human 
rights and implementation of donor funded programmes. However, due to 
IHNGO unwillingness to be coordinated or controlled directly by states, 
and their wish to maintain their independence, donor state aid and 
development is increasingly being channelled through direct aid to 
governments in post-conflict states, and through donor states‟ militaries, 
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and national and international contractors.2 The IHNGOs run the risk of 
sidelining themselves in these crises through their resistance to 
cooperation with the intervening states. 
 
The space for IHNGOs to be neutral, impartial and independent has 
shrunk. This is due to the realist state-centric concern with security that 
now envisions the security of the state as being predicated on securing 
populations in other countries from the worst excesses of poverty, violence 
and inequality that lead to trans-border security threats such as terrorism 
and organised crime. Aid and development are the means, alongside 
military force, used to achieve this, and IHNGOs often have a role in its 
implementation. Combined with this, IHNGOs, since the end of the Cold 
War, have advocated for and against interventions, worked with and stood 
apart from military and political action, and developed a new humanitarian 
approach that now has a political agenda due to the experiences of the 
1990s. This approach sets up IHNGOs as the ideal implementing partners 
who can work to improve the human security in unstable or post-conflict 
regions thereby reinforcing the wider security concerns of the intervening 
states.  
 
The consequences of state-building for IHNGOs in 
Afghanistan 
The state-building project in Afghanistan has severely compromised the 
security of the multi-mandate IHNGOs. They have been caught in a 
dilemma where they have supported the establishment of a new 
government and called for international forces to extend security for their 
operations, but the deployment of international forces was slow and on a 
small scale relative to other interventions.3 This involvement with a light-
footprint approach to state-building has involved IHNGOs in filling a 
vacuum in development, especially in areas like education, health and 
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governance, for example the NSP in Afghanistan, and developing the 
capacity of the new or transitional government.  They now find 
themselves, although unwillingly, at odds with the insurgents who are 
attacking the Afghan government, international forces, and now also the 
IHNGOs. 
 
Provincial Reconstruction Teams 
The role of PRTs 
The PRT concept has been deployed in Afghanistan and Iraq. Aside from 
the criticism from IHNGOs regarding the confusion about military and 
humanitarian actors, PRTs have attempted to be many things to the 
various interests in the Afghan conflict. They have been a way for smaller 
states, or states unwilling to deploy large numbers of troops in a fighting 
role, to contribute civil-military units that are acceptable domestically and 
internationally. They have varied in composition, size and activities and 
have been tasked with reconstruction, hearts and minds QIPs, security 
sector reform, improving governance and extending Afghan government 
legitimacy and control. They have also been spread thinly with each team 
generally only 100 to 150 personnel in strength. If they were to specialise 
in one main task that exploited their security role, they would be more 
effective and this would lessen the pressure on the humanitarian space for 
IHNGOs. Improving security is the role that IHNGOs would prefer them to 
focus on, and away from aid and development. 
 
PRTs and state-building 
The PRTs‟ composition, activities, size and deployment reflect the wider 
light-footprint model for state-building. They combine military and civilian 
staff in an integrated approach, they are expected to bring security and 
reconstruction but have small numbers of staff to achieve this, they 
operate according to their respective donor states‟ wishes and, like NGOs 
in the 1990s, they are peripheral to wider military or political outcomes that 
could ultimately end the conflict.  They also appeal to the vision of military 
humanitarian intervention that grew in the 1990s, as the combination of 
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military, civilian, security and development roles puts into practice the idea 
of armed humanitarians. In the absence of security, with IHNGOs unable 
to operate, PRTs can take on the development role in the build phase of 
counter-insurgency operations, but this is predicated on the area having 
been shaped, cleared and held by actual combat units, indicating that hard 
security and politics still dictate the realities on the ground in Afghanistan. 
 
Implications for the use of PRTs in the future 
The PRT concept, while currently embedded in occupation and counter-
insurgent conflicts, will be useful for UN humanitarian intervention and 
peace-keeping operations.  Currently PRTs are deployed in two conflicts 
that are to do with the US and its allies‟ GWOT rather than UN 
interventions. The PRT model will be useful in state-building in future UN 
integrated missions in post-conflict or post-natural disaster settings, such 
as in the recent earthquake in Haiti, where security is necessary to support 
emergency aid and reconstruction and to oppose looters and criminals. 
 
IHNGOs 
Implications for IHNGOs in zones of conflict 
The implications for IHNGOs in actual conflict zones, as opposed to post-
conflict settings, are that they can either continue to attempt to distance 
themselves from the political and military situations in which they operate 
or accept a pragmatic approach that recognises there are situations when 
they need to support the political and military action that will allow them to 
recommence operations. IHNGOs are finding they cannot operate in an 
actual war zone where their non-belligerent status is not recognised by 
one side and, therefore, the security that is required for their activities in 
these settings can only be achieved by military force or a political 
settlement that halts the conflict. 
 
The humanitarian/development divide 
The divide between humanitarian and multi-mandate agencies is 
significant in this context since the humanitarian agencies are able to 
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claim they are not complicit in the agenda of state-building, while the 
development aspects of multi-mandate agencies have a clear vision of 
states, societies, rights and political systems that are required to achieve 
long term and sustainable livelihoods for the populations they assist.  
 
In Afghanistan, the humanitarian relief agencies, the ICRC and MSF, have 
been the victims of fatal attacks. However, there is documented longer-
term acceptance of, and dialogue with, the ICRC compared to other 
agencies in Afghanistan. This has been found to be a trend in other 
conflict situations as well,4 and indicates that the ICRC has been able to 
establish a credible, although not total, acceptance from those opposed to 
internationally backed governments and the forces that support them. 
 
Options for IHNGOs 
Options for IHNGOs that wish to operate independently from the state-
building agenda include tightening operational security, withdrawal or 
suspension of activities, use of PSCs for training and security 
assessments, and interagency sharing of security updates and analysis of 
trends so as to be aware of potential security threats.  The acceptance 
strategy is still the one practiced by most IHNGOs, in that they seek to be 
protected from insurgent or criminal attack by the community they operate 
in, since their work is valuable and the community has a long-term stake in 
the agency and its projects. Unfortunately in the highly politicised 
environment of Afghanistan this approach has been limited in its 
effectiveness. 
 
The dilemma of IHNGO development aid in a conflict situation 
IHNGO development aid within an ongoing conflict is a complex problem. 
The nature of development, how it is done, how it is prioritised, who does 
it, where it is done and who it is done for make it inherently political. When 
there is intra-state political conflict, those engaged in development 
become politicised and implicated in the conflict by default. If it becomes 
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an armed conflict, development aid becomes a military resource with the 
potential to be exploited by one side and targeted by opponents. 
 
Truly non-governmental development 
For IHNGOs to undertake development activity and be truly neutral in a 
conflict situation they would need to seek funding outside of the donor 
state model, remain neutral towards state-building and the actions of 
governments, and engage with all actors involved in the conflict. Their 
decisions about who to assist would need to be strictly needs based. If this 
hypothetical scenario occurred there are interesting issues surrounding 
whether they would be tolerated by belligerents, including intervening 
forces supporting the state-building project. The other major implication for 
this approach would be the likely drastic reduction in an organisation‟s 
funding and political influence. This would, however, enable IHNGOs to 
more truly claim they were independent of state influence and of any 
particular political or social agenda.  
 
MSF, although a short term medical aid IHNGO, presents a model in its 
neutral, non-political stance, independent funding and volunteer basis. An 
IHNGO that promoted grass roots, community development without 
borders would be a way for GCS to avoid state politicisation of 
development aid. While the project would be working towards growth that 
was compatible with, and parallel to, long-term state aims, it would be 
independent from directly working with the state. Mark Duffield argues that 
NGOs in relation to the developed state security agenda are trapped in a 
“hopeless enmeshment,” but he also points out the importance for 
development to move past the “liberal inclination to prejudge those who 
are different.” 5 Independent development that was tailored to the local, 
cultural and social situation it existed in, and that focussed on improving 
the material comfort of peoples‟ lives in ways they understood and agreed 
to presents one option. It is an option that would question the cultural and 
political role of IHNGOs, but they have already started this process in 
                                            
5
 Mark Duffield, „Development, Security and Unending War,‟p.231 and p.234. 
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promoting community driven development. The most difficult thing for 
IHNGOs that undertook this path would be the relinquishing of any real or 
perceived political influence on the actions of states: to be truly non-
governmental. 
 
Acceptance that development is inherently political 
With regard to longer-term development work, the most likely path for 
IHNGOs is to accept that military security is required when a conflict is still 
ongoing and the forces in opposition to state-building are attacking the 
development process, of which IHNGOs are a part. IHNGOs did advocate 
the implementation of ISAF security throughout the country in 2003 and 
2004 and, ultimately, an improved security environment implemented by 
international and Afghan forces is going to better serve their goals for 
social development and human rights than a return to Taliban rule. It is 
unlikely that IHNGOs will willingly agree to be a part of the build phase in 
counter-insurgency operations as the military would like, since this would 
give some credence to the AOG claims that they are agents of the 
occupying forces. 
 
A humanitarian consortium 
A way forward that is reflected in the relative success of the ICRC‟s 
acceptance with all parties to the conflict would be the development of a 
new humanitarian consortium. Humanitarian NGOs and the humanitarian 
wings of multi-mandate IHNGOs could come under this umbrella, distinct 
from state-building development with a strict focus on short-term, non-
politicised relief work. This organisation would be accompanied by a 
corresponding media campaign outlining its neutrality, impartiality and 
independence to civilians, belligerents and political actors in the country 
and the region.6  
 
                                            
6
 Antonio Donini, Afghanistan: Humanitarianism Under Threat, p.9. 
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Areas for further study 
This study has drawn out the consequences of the post-Cold War, and 
now GWOT, coming together of aid and development within the security 
agenda of western developed states and the consequences for IHNGOs. 
Areas for further study include: 
 The ICRC has, according to the literature7 and an interview8 been 
the organisation that has maintained the most acceptance with all 
belligerents including the AOGs. Scrutinising the reasons for this by 
reference to a specific study would provide examples of, and 
implications for, the establishment of a humanitarian consortium 
based on similar principles to the ICRC. 
 
 A comprehensive study of post-Cold War and GWOT state-building 
would enable the development of a typology of interventions and 
relate the different intervention types to the consequences for aid 
agencies that deploy in these environments. For example, the 
differences between the Kosovo and Afghanistan interventions. 
 
 Further study of the extent of the inclusion of coherent or integrated 
approaches into the aid, development, foreign and security policy of 
donor states would improve understanding of how widespread and 
effective they are. 
 
 National and faith based NGOs were left outside the scope of this 
study and present an area for further research in terms of their 
experiences in the new state-building paradigm compared with 
secular IHNGOs. 
 
                                            
7
 Antonio Donini, Afghanistan: Humanitarianism Under Threat, p.2. 
8
 Kevin Baff, Armed Forces Delegate, ICRC, Afghanistan. Interview, Hamilton, NZ, 
January 8, 2010. 
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 The New Zealand government stated in 2009 that it will phase out 
its PRT and pass the work over to civilians and aid workers.9 The 
phase-out process of a PRT and the hand-over to civilians and 
potentially NGOs would be a useful study for the implications for 
future phasing out of PRTs due to their redundancy, military 
withdrawal or a political settlement.
                                            
9
 Claire Trevett, „SAS Will Face Stronger Taleban‟ New Zealand Herald, August 11 2009, 
<http://www.nzherald.co.nz/afghanistan/news/article.cfm?l_id=12&objectid=10589940> 
[Accessed March 1, 2010]. 
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